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For two centuries, the private violence of American history has paraded
into courts for public trial. Often dramatized by the spectacle of rape and mur-
der, the public trials of private violence increasingly are seen to decide the
fates of both the accused and the victim of crime. The fate of community,
whether the community of the victim, the accused, or the public, seems at first
blush untouched by such trials. Like victims and their families, however, com-
munities struck by violence suffer profound loss. That loss is expressed in the
destruction ofpublic discourse, reason, and citizenship. This public ruin is not
simply the result of interpretive and material violence; rather it is a conse-
quence as well of the force of law and legal agents. The forum of law's vio-
lence is the criminal justice system. The agents of its advocacy are prosecutors
and criminal defense lawyers. Their acts and ethics work to shape the prose-
cution of violence. When that prosecution confronts race, law and community
each faces trial and, inevitably, the despoiling of public interracial dialogue.
Indeed, the prosecution of racial violence typically silences the reasoned public
deliberation and exchange necessary to construct interracial community. The
norms and narratives of community and criminal justice heard at the trials of
private racial violence by no means ordain this result. Reflecting the institu-
tional and regulatory complexity of multiple prosecutorial roles and burdens,
those norms and narratives grant both freedom and constraint in the prosecu-
tion of racially motivated violence. Guided by the lessons of law reform move-
ments and the teachings of grassroots community organizations, the challenge
for prosecutors in race cases is to overcome the burden of silencing tradition
and to explore the discretionary freedom of reconstructing interracial commu-
nity.
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This essay explores the subject of law, violence, and community in con-
temporary America. Part of a larger project investigating the role of race,
lawyers, and ethics in the American criminal justice system, the essay draws
on both jurisprudential and interdisciplinary materials to probe the socio-
legal text and the historical context of racially motivated violence in two re-
cent high-profile criminal trials: the 1990-91 Central Park Jogger sexual as-
sault trials in New York City, and the 1998-99 James Byrd murder trials in Jas-
per, Texas.2 Exploding at the intersection of law, culture, and society, the
socio-legal text of racial violence finds important, albeit partial, expression
in the discourse of criminal justice advocacy. Inscribed in the speech, writ-
ing, and symbolic gesture of prosecutors and defense attorneys, that text sig-
nifies the juridical translation of violence into word.3 For these pivotal legal
actors, translation occurs in the language of law and in the adversarial con-
duct of lawyering.
The commonplace translation of speech and conduct in the criminal
courtroom carries moral significance for both the quotidian plea bargain and
the banner murder trial. Significance flows from the private and public con-
struction of identity in the narratives of legal storytelling. Defendants and
victims together bear the physical and psychological marks of identity: class,
race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, even age. Semiotic ad-
hesions, the marks attach as well to the geographic spaces of a community
and to the institutional agents of the state.
Although often clashing as competing agents under the unequal wages of
the state, prosecutors and defense attorneys nonetheless share in telling sto-
ries of identity. The stories pronounce narratives of guilt and innocence,
pain and punishment, and remorse and forgiveness. The same stories some-
1. For a comprehensive account of the Central Park Jogger trials, see TIMOTHY SULLIVAN,
UNEQUAL VERDICTS: THE CENTRAL PARK JOGGER TRIALS (1992).
2. For concluding accounts of the James Byrd trials and their cultural significance, see Rich-
ard Stewart, Grieving for "Son", Although the Trials of His Killers Are Over, the Family of James
Byrd Jr. Is Just Beginning to Deal With Personal Mourning, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 21, 1999,
at Al; Justice Wins Swiftly as Jasper Saga Ends, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Nov. 23, 1999, at
1B4; Roberta Smith, An Ugly Legacy Lives on, Its Glare Unsoftened by Age, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,
2000, at El.
3. The subject of state violence and the juridical word evokes the work of Robert Cover. See
Robert M. Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed, and the Role,
20 GA. L. REV. 815 (1986); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986);
see generally NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER (Martha
Minow, Michael Ryan, & Austin Sarat eds., 1992). Unlike Cover's writings, this essay, its accom-
panying series of case studies on criminal justice, and its predecessor series on poverty law, focus
on the role of legal advocates, rather than adjudicators. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of
Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1721 (1994) (reviewing LAW'S
VIOLENCE (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992) and examining the role of poverty law-
yers in the context of disability law advocacy).
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times vocalize narratives of race. At trial, racial narratives occupy multiple
forms, each contingent on the stance of the participating legal actor.
Consider for a moment the racial stance of lawyers and judges exhibited
by the form of their narrative participation in the prosecution, defense, and
adjudication of a criminal trial. Lawyers, for example, declare racial narra-
tives in their opening statements and closing arguments. Moreover, they
elicit and suppress such declarations from witnesses on direct and cross-
examination. Judges, by comparison, proclaim racial narratives in adjudi-
cating pretrial motions, deciding evidentiary objections, and issuing jury in-
structions.
The multiplicity and contingency of narrative form in race trials creates
an opacity of color. Narratives that appear transparently racial or colored at
first blush frequently acquire a density of racial meaning and a layering of
color on closer inspection. The opaque quality and shifting form of racial
narratives combine to render the meaning of color elusive and unstable. That
rendering confounds substantive attempts to classify racial narratives in
terms of their colorblind, color-coded, or color-conscious content.
The frustrations of evaluating narrative form and content when con-
fronting race at trial in no way diminishes the importance of the inquiry. Like
the customary narratives of criminal prosecution and defense, racial narra-
tives describe the actions, emotions, and motivations of defendants, victims,
and law enforcement agents. However mutable and contingent, the narra-
tives also characterize the ethos of a community and the mores of a state. In
doing so, they capture not only the racial tenor of a specific historical period,
but also its morality, and its democratic progress.
Advocacy in both civil and criminal law proceedings unfolds against the
backdrop of specific historical contexts. The contextual framework of racial
violence intertwines historical strands of culture, economics, politics, and
society. The culture of racial violence emerges from antebellum and post-
bellum traditions of black moral and scientific degradation. The economics
of racial violence, in contrast, arise out of agrarian, industrial, and interna-
tional systems of class competition and inequality. The politics of such vio-
lence stem from public contests over the acquisition and maintenance of ra-
cial power and privilege. Similarly, the social organization and relations of
racial violence emanate from private and public group hierarchy and subor-
dination.
American legal history teaches that socio-legal norms and narratives
weave the strands of culture, economics, politics, and society into a recurrent
pattern of racial violence: symbolic, spatial and textual. In the high-profile
criminal trials under scrutiny here, this pattern of violence is marked by tra-
ditional figurations of racial identity, racialized narrative, and race-conscious
representation. Rooted in antebellum and postbellum visions of racial status
[Vol. 52:809
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and community, the figures of black and white identity, dominant and subor-
dinate narrative, and color-conscious representation pervade the law, law-
yering, and ethics of criminal justice.
The antebellum vision of racial status and community portrays people of
African descent-the black juveniles of the Central Park Jogger case and
James Byrd himself-as a primitive species of property. Consigned by this
vision to a pitiable or pathologic place in the great chain of being, blacks and
other people of color are perceived to inhabit a naturally inferior identity
marked either by deviance and defiance, or by acquiescence and subservi-
ence, even when such servility plainly constitutes performatively disguised
resistance. Descriptions of this deformed identity echo in the narrative tones
of benevolence, discipline, and domination heard for two centuries in Ameri-
can courtrooms. These tones sound through the legal rhetoric of state-
sanctioned segregation and the lawyer's art of race-conscious representation
in the prosecution and defense of racial violence.
The idea of innate mental and moral inequality between the black and
white races is not peculiar to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American
law and society. The postbellum vision of racial status and community pro-
pels that idea into the twentieth century in the stereotyped and ritualistic deg-
radation of sharecropper and convict lease identity, and impoverished urban
welfare identity. Narrative accounts of this abased status stress the margin-
ality of, and the necessity of control over, former black chattel slaves and
migrants, rather than the aspiration of inherent moral perfectibility. Emanci-
pation and the Enlightenment idea of progress neither cure this condition nor
bring about the unity of interracial community. Although emancipation en-
larges the space for the growth of black individual resistance into group dis-
sidence, it fails to displace the ambivalence toward interracial community
animating the continued debate over differentiation and sameness in the
politics, law, and ethics of the criminal justice system.
Entangled in constitutional history and political struggle, that debate
turns on the conviction of and the commitment to race neutrality. Colorblind
rules and sameness regimes comport with neutrality precepts. Color-
conscious rules and differentiation regimes conflict with such precepts. At
bottom, resolution hinges on the standing granted to moral claims of racial
recognition and difference in law and politics.
The essay at hand joins the debate over the moral standing of race by in-
terrogating the meaning of racial identity, racialized narrative, and color-
conscious representation for law, lawyering, and ethics in cases of racially-
motivated violence.4 The purpose of the enterprise is both descriptive and
4. Prior works in this project traced the sometimes mutable configurations of racial identity,
narrative, and representation through a battery of case studies. The first work demonstrated that
black criminal defense stories portray competing visions of racial identity and articulate conflicting
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prescriptive. Descriptively, the essay recounts the prosecution of racial vio-
lence in two prominent cases: the 1989 Central Park Jogger sexual assault in
New York City and the 1998 James Byrd murder in Jasper, Texas. The account
focuses on the nature of prosecutorial norms and narratives, their cultural and
social significance, and their impact on interracial community. Prescriptively,
the essay proposes to reform prosecutorial norms and narratives in order to
reconstruct interracial community in the aftermath of racially-motivated vio-
lence. My thesis is that prosecutors and prosecutorial policies of community
activism may play a valuable role in reconciling segregated communities
divided by racial violence.
Part I of the essay examines the idea of community in American law,
surveying relevant norms and narratives found in the criminal justice system.
The survey highlights the community norms and narratives often embedded
in the constitutional, statutory, and common law doctrines of state and fed-
eral criminal law. It searches out discursive evidence of such norms and nar-
ratives in the prosecution of the Central Park Jogger and James Byrd cases.
Part II describes the role, function, and regulation of prosecutors acting
under state and federal criminal justice systems. The description culls prose-
cutorial norms and narratives from governing ethics rules and standards.
Drawing on the Central Park Jogger and James Byrd trials, it demonstrates
racialized narratives, some pernicious, others transformative. By black criminal defense stories, I
mean stories urged on behalf of black criminal defendants for purposes of acquittal or mitigation.
Advanced by black and white criminal defense lawyers, the stories present race-based narratives of
innocence, justification, and mercy. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 1301 (1995) [hereinafter Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence] (studying black-on-white racially
motivated violence, culled from the defense of Damian Williams and Henry Watson on charges of
beating Reginald Denny and others during the 1992 South Central Los Angeles riots); see also An-
thony V. Alfieri, Race-ing Legal Ethics, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (1996) (responding to Robin Barnes'
critique of a proposed alternative ethic of race-conscious responsibility).
The second work showed that white criminal defense stories likewise embody a narrative form
and a racialized substance concordant with a history of black oppression. White criminal defense
stories echo the same narratives of innocence, justification, and mercy but conjure up a different
imagery and rhetoric of race. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory ofRacialized
Defenses, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1997) (studying defense of white-on-black racially incited vio-
lence extracted from the criminal and civil trials of the Alabama Ku Klux Klan in the 1981 lynching
of Michael Donald).
The third work established a classification scheme to map the discursive structure of race tri-
als. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1293 (1998) (analyzing race trials win-
nowed from the successive state criminal and federal civil rights prosecutions of Lemrick Nelson
and Charles Price based on four days of interracial violence in the Crown Heights section of New
York City in 1991).
The fourth work confirmed the feasibility and legitimacy of race-conscious federal prosecution.
See Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, 48 DUKE LJ. 1157 (1999) (explicating a race-conscious
model of prosecutorial discretion garnered from the federal criminal civil rights prosecution of five
white New York City police officers on charges of assaulting Abner Louima, a Haitian immigrant, at a
Brooklyn station house in 1997).
RECONSTRUCTING COMMUNITY
that such norms and narratives construct multiple prosecutorial roles with
accompanying burdens of freedom and constraint.
Part III explores methods of reconceiving the prosecutorial norms and
narratives employed in cases of racial violence in the hope of reconstructing
interracial community. The exploration considers the cultural and societal
relevance of such norms and narratives in combating the varied forms, con-
texts, and categories of racial violence illustrated in the Central Park Jogger
and James Byrd trials. It also assesses the potentially fruitful relationship of
lawyers to community, citing examples from contemporary law reform
movements. Finally it evaluates the compatibility of prosecutorial norms and
narratives with the evolving jurisprudence of race in American law, particu-
larly the notions of postmodern racial identity and community.
I. LAW AND COMMUNITY
The idea of community is fundamental to American law. It pervades
federal and state constitutions, statutes, and common law doctrines. It also
suffuses professional rhetoric and regulation. Most important, it links law to
politics, culture, and society. Yet, the relationship of law to community
stands unsure despite a growing jurisprudential and interdisciplinary litera-
ture on the meaning of community.5 Applicable to both civil6 and criminal
law7 fields, the literature assembles a wide-ranging collection of community
norms and narratives.
The instant inquiry searches out a cluster of the community norms and
narratives basic to the criminal justice system. Like any modem juridical
admixture, the criminal justice system involves laws, legal agents, and socio-
legal institutions. Criminal laws encompass constitutional injunctions,
statutory proscriptions, and common law prohibitions. Legal agents include
adjudicators, advocates (prosecutors and defense attorneys), and enforcement
actors (police, parole, probation, and correction officers).8 Juridical institu-
tions comprise courts, law enforcement organizations, and correction agen-
cies. Bound together, the laws and legal agents of the criminal justice system
combine to produce contextually tailored institutional discourses and rela-
tions. The Central Park Jogger and James Byrd trials evince the normative
5. For examples of this multidisciplinary literature, see JOEL F. HANDLER, LAW AND THE
SEARCH FOR COMMUNrrY (1990); MARTHA MiNOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUsION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP
(1995).
6. On community, social justice, and narrative, see Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court,
1982 Term: Foreword Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1983).
7. On community, crime, and narrative, see Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim
Impact Statements, 63 U. CI-I. L. REV. 361 (1996).
8. Additional legal agents germane to the criminal justice system include federal and state
legislative and administrative officials.
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framework and narrative content of such discourses and relations. Before
parsing these trials, I turn first to the nature of community norms and narra-
tives.
A. Community Norms and Narratives
Community norms and narratives express visions of human nature, poli-
tics, economics, culture, and society. In American law, community means
more than popular sovereignty.9 It captures notions of deliberative democ-
racy and autonomy,' 0 and the underlying assumptions of decisional compe-
tence and emotional capacity." It also crosses the boundary line separating
public and private spheres, forging a collective path to self-identity. For in-
dividuals in the private sphere, Michael Sandel observes, "[c]ommunity de-
scribes not just what they have as fellow citizens but also what they are
.... "12 To these individuals, community is "not a relationship they choose
(as in a voluntary association) but an attachment they discover."13 In this
crucial sense, community is "not merely an attribute but a constituent of their
identity."14
In public spheres, community represents something more than a univocal
ideal.15 Within its broad ambit, displayed in the Central Park Jogger and
James Byrd trials, community finds diverse historical realization in race,
class, gender, age, and geography.16 Realization comes in the colors of black
9. On the place of popular sovereignty in constitutional theory, see James E. Fleming, We the
Unconventional American People, 65 U. CH. L. REV. 1513, 1535 (1998) (reviewing BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) and criticizing reductionist tendency in
constitutional theory to overemphasize the value of popular sovereignty).
10. For careful mining of the underpinnings of deliberative democracy and autonomy, see
James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6-56 (1995).
11. Deliberative democracy and autonomy stand contingent on individual decisional compe-
tence and, by extension, emotional capacity. For an analysis of the linkage between emotional
capacity and decision-making competence, see Paul S. Appelbaum, Ought We to Require Emotional
Capacity as Part of Decisional Competence?, 8 KENNEDY INST. ETmCS J. 377, 379-84 (1998)
(evaluating accounts of emotional capacity as an element of decision-making competence).
12. MICHAEL SANDEL, LmERALISM AND THE LIMITs OF JUSTICE 150 (1982) (emphasis in
original). On this view, community invokes "not just a feeling but a mode of self-understanding
partly constitutive of the agent's identity." Id. (emphasis in original). He adds:
[rio say that the members of a society are bound by a sense of community is not simply to say
that a great many of them profess communitarian sentiments and pursue communitarian aims,
but rather that they conceive their identity-the subject and not just the object of their feelings
and aspirations-as defined to some extent by the community of which the are a part.
Id. (emphasis in original).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. James Bohman derides the assumption of a univocal public sphere. See James Bohman,
Citizenship and Norms of Publicity: Wide Public Reason in Cosmopolitan Societies, 27 POL.
THEORY 176, 198 (1999).
16. Bobman adverts to a variegated sense of the public. See id.
[Vol. 52:809
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and white, the classes of privilege and impoverishment, the gendering of the
masculine and feminine, and the geography of the urban and the rural. When
such realizations intrude violently upon the private sphere of self- or collec-
tively-governed community, or encroach wrongfully upon the shared public
realm of state-sanctioned community, they spur protest, regulation, and here
punishment. Spoken claims of protest inside the criminal courts of New
York City or outside on the courthouse steps of Jasper County may assert the
expressive injury of class, stigma, and racial silencing.17 Clouded by the
ambiguity of motive and the vagueness of offensive speech,18 the suscepti-
bility of such community claims of injury to the reasoned advocacy and ad-
judication of liberal legalism remains unresolved.
Despite their liberal antinomies, the norms of racial community appear
steadfast. In the race trials of the Central Park Jogger and James Byrd,
norms imbued by antebellum segregationist ideology and postbellum inte-
grationist ideology collide. That collision shatters the integrationist pretense
of enlightened liberal consensus and harmony in race relations.19 The result
reveals competing visions of community colored by overt racial animus and
covert racial bias. Ideologies of racial consensus and harmony, though wide-
spread,20 cloak conflict over invidious discrimination in economics and poli-
tics as well as in culture and society. The sharpness of racial conflict and
competition produces hate crimes of interracial violence.
The signifring systems of liberal legal narrative, oral and written,21 cir-
culate both antebellum segregationist ideology and postbellum integrationist
17. On speech regulation, protest, and community, see Christina E. Wells, Of Communists
and Anti-Abortion Protesters: The Consequences of Falling Into the Theoretical Abyss, 33 GA. L.
REV. 1, 48-52 (1998) (discussing prior restraint doctrine in recent Supreme Court abortion protest
decisions).
18. Wells points to the ambiguity of motive and the vagueness of offensive speech as impedi-
ments to state regulation of the multiple speech forms of community protest. See id. at 52-62.
Vagueness plagues both civil and criminal law rules. See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality,
Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 219-42 (19.85); Robert C.
Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 CAL. L. REv. 491,492-503
(1994).
19. Gary Peller understands integrationism "to comprise a set of attitudes and beliefs for per-
ceiving the meaning of racist domination and for identifying the goals of racial justice." Gary Pel-
ler, Race Consciousness, DUKE L.J. 758, 767 (1990). For Peller, the key elements of integrationist
ideology pertain to the concepts of prejudice, discrimination, and segregation. Id. at 767-68. The
integrationist cure for race-based discrimination on an individual level, he explains, rests on "equal
treatment according to neutral norms." Id. at 770.
20. On the meaning of harmony ideology in a racial setting, see LAURA NADER, HARMONY
IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC MOUNTAIN VILLAGE 291-308 (1990) (analyzing
dispute and self-determination as properties of harmony ideology within a system of hegemonic
control).
21. Both oral and written narratives constitute socio-legal signifying systems. See Diana Dig-
ges & Joanne Rappaport, Literacy, Orality, and Ritual Practice in Highland Columbia, in THm
ETHNOGRAPHY OF READING 139, 139-55 (Jonathan Boyarin ed., 1993) (examining the importance
of oral narratives within a Columbian community).
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ideology. Like cultural and societal narratives, legal narratives are nonlinear
and multi-vocal.22 As the Central Park Jogger and James Byrd trials show,
the presence of "multi-vocal and nonlinear legalities in any given legal uni-
verse" fails to ensure that "each legal voice has the same authority or level of
power."23 The voices of antebellum and postbellum racial status and com-
munity consequently may be amplified and at other times repressed by the
prosecution and defense traditions of the criminal justice system.
The multi-vocal and nonlinear quality of legal narratives leads to inter-
texuality. Narrative intertextuality denotes the interlinking of communica-
tive forms of literacy and orality,24 and the intersecting of multiple, conflict-
ing narratives. Such linkages may generate transformative narratives that
modulate debased images and problematize degrading archetypes.25 Narra-
tives modulate debased images by projecting a different vision of the subject
(e.g., juvenile offender) and the experience of repressed subjectivity (abuse,
impoverishment, and segregation). In the same way, they problematize de-
grading archetypes by infusing the reimagined subject with an alternate, ele-
vated status of human agency. The process of reimagining and reinvesting
racial images and archetypes gives rise to counter images and archetypes. To
the extent that such counter figures open space for the voice of excluded or
silenced histories,26 they spur a transformative process empowering and inte-
grating outsider communities.27 Over time, transformative narratives may
create alternative visions of law and community.
B. The Central Park Jogger and James Byrd Trials
The Central Park Jogger and the James Byrd, Jr. trials present random
acts of group violence inspired by class, gender, and racial antagonisms.
22. See Mark Ryan Goodale, Literate Legality and Oral Legality Reconsidered, 16 CURRENT
LEGAL THEORY 3, 14 (1998) (noting that the very "processes by which legal meanings and identi-
ties are created and maintained are in every context nonlinear and multi-voca?' and contending that
"there is never ohe legality, but multiple legalities, which can be understood as embodying different
genres" of culture and society) (emphasis in original).
23. Id.
24. On narrative intertextuality in the oral and written traditions of the criminal law at trial,
see SUSAN U. PILIs, IDEOLOGY IN THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES: How JUDGES PRACnTCE LAW,
PoLIIcs, AND COURTROOM CONTROL 27-47 (1998).
25. Larry Backer contends that the modulation of imagery requires stories that problematize
archetypes and create alternative characterizations. See Larry Cata Backer, Queering Theory: An
Essay on the Conceit of Revolution in Law, in LEGAL QUERmEs: LESBIAN, GAY AND
TRANSGENDER LEGAL STUDIES 185, 196 (Leslie J. Moran, Daniel Monk, & Sarah Beresford eds.,
1998).
26. Backer looks to voice as "the measure of power." Id. He notes that "[t]hose who seek to
speak, seek also to exclude, to limit the possibility that archetypes vill be redrawm." Id.
27. Jean Love notes that "'outsider' narratives are an excellent vehicle for enabling legal re-
formers to hear previously-excluded voices." Jean C. Love, The Value of Narrative in Legal Schol-
arship and Teaching, 2 J. GENDER, RACE & JUsTICE 87, 97 (1998).
[Vol. 52:809
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Located in urban and rural settings, the trials catalogue the grotesque vio-
lence of gang rape and lynching. The Central Park Jogger trials embroiled
more than ten black and I-Ispanic young men, ages fourteen to eighteen, in
the beating and rape of a white twenty-nine-year-old woman on April 19,
1989.28 Assaulted during an early evening jog in Central Park, the woman, a
well-educated investment banker, suffered multiple fractures and lacerations,
placing her into a deep coma from which she nearly died and inflicting per-
manent disabilities.29 Two trials and five plea bargains on felony charges of
attempted murder, rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, and assault resulted in sen-
tences ranging from six months to fifteen years in jail.30
Branded by media-driven public outrage,31 the Central Park Jogger case
exposed racial tensions in New York City32 and provoked claims of disparate
treatment33 and invidious classification leveled against the New York City
criminal justice system.34 The James Byrd, Jr. trials, by comparison, in-
volved the lynching of a black disabled forty-nine-year-old former vacuum
cleaner salesman and father of three.35 On June 7, 1998, Shawn Berry and
Bill King, both aged twenty-three and avowed white supremacists36 and their
28. See IMOTHY SULLIVAN, UNEQUAL VERDICTS: THE CENTRAL PARK JOGGER TRIALS 19-
23 (1992).
29. See id. at 56, 129-31,241-42.
30. See id. at 54, 288-312, 319-20.
31. See HELEN BENEDICT, VIRGIN OR VAMP: How THE PRESS COVERS SEX CRIMES (1992);
Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1268 (1991) (observing that none of the "many
equally horrifying rapes" occurring during the Central Park jogger media coverage "elicited the
public expression of horror and outrage that attended the Central Park rape") (footnote omitted).
32. See James Morsch, The Problem of Motive in Hate Crimes: The Argument Against Pre-
sumptions of Racial Motivation, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 659, 683 n.51 (1991) (comment-
ing that the attack on the Central Park jogger by a gang of black youths and the subsequent criminal
trial "illustrated the city's highly charged racial atmosphere, not simply a case of rape")
33. See James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Hate Crimes: A Critical Perspective, 22
CRIE & JUST. 1, 35 (1997) (mentioning that "the failure to bring a hate crime charge in the gang
rape and near-fatal beating of the Central Park jogger led some observers to accuse the police and
the mayor of adhering to a double standard in labeling hate crimes"); see also Nancy S. Ehrenreich,
O.J. Simpson & the Myth of Gender/Race Conflict, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 931, 944-45 (1996) (dis-
cussing white feminist response when crimes of black male violence against white female victims
seem "taken much more seriously than similar crimes against women of color").
34. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories 1. Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom,
5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 387, 453, 456-57 (1996) (noting the racial theme of the
"Black Beast' in cases of black-on-white rape).
35. See Terri Langford, Third Trial to Begin in Jasper Death: Prosecutors to Focus on Sus-
pect's 2 Stories, DALLAS MORNING NEWs, Oct. 25, 1999, at IA; Patty Reinert & Richard Stewart,
Last of Three Trials in Dragging Death Starting in Jasper, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 25, 1999, at
A13.
36. See Patty Reinert, Byrd's Slaying Called the Basis for Hate Group: Prosecutor Says King
Wanted 'Respect'for New Racist Gang, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb. 17, 1999, at Al; Richard
Stewart, Suspect's Writings Point to Role as Organizer of 'Rebel Soldiers,'HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
Feb. 17, 1999, at 1; Richard Stewart, Attorney: Defendant Not Racist: Jasper Court Told "He Has
No Motive," HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 26, 1999, at A15.
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roommate Russell Brewer, Jr., aged thirty-one, kidnapped and assaulted
Byrd, sprayed his face with black paint, pulled his trousers and under shorts
down, chained him by the ankles to a pickup truck, and dragged him alive
and conscious along a three-mile rural paved road until a concrete culvert
beside the road decapitated his body.37 The three white men then dumped
Byrd's "shredded torso, minus his head, an arm and shoulder" at the end of a
country road "directly between a black cemetery and church."38 Indicative of
white supremacy,39 the Byrd lynching belongs to a long pattern and practice
of bias-motivated crimes in Texas40 often incited locally by the Ku Klux
Klan.41 Originating in the postbellum era of the late nineteenth century,42
that pattern and practice historically expressed a widespread community
ethos celebrating racial violence.a3
In early July, 1998, a Jasper County grand jury indicted King, Brewer,
and Berry on capital murder charges alleging that they kidnapped Byrd and
dragged him to his death.44 In February, 1999, a predominantly white Jasper
County jury found King guilty and sentenced him to death.45 In late Septem-
ber, 1999, a mainly white Bryan County jury found Brewer also guilty and
37. See Patty Reinert & Richard Stewart, Doctor Details "Devastating Pain" of Dragging:
Prosecutors Finish Case with Gruesome Testimony, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 17, 1999, at A33;
Barry Shlachter, Officer Says Jasper Victim's Pants Taken Down, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
Sept. 15, 1999, at I; Bruce Tomaso, Prosecution Rests in 2nd Jasper Trial: Doctor Catalogs List of
Injuries to Byrd, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 17, 1999, at 29A.
38. See Michael Graczyk, Third Dragging Death Trial Begins with Start of Jury Selection,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct 25, 1999.
39. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity,
Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 114 (1999) (commenting that
that Byrd lynching constituted "a horrible manifestation of white supremacy and the social con-
struction of black maleness as threatening and in need of violent restraint").
40. See Andrew M. Gilbert & Eric D. Marchand, Splitting the Atom or Splitting Hairs-The
Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 931, 945 (citing the Byrd incident as one
of a number of recent bias-motivated crimes in Texas).
41. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer's Fiftieth Anniversary: "A Time for Keeping;
a Time for Throwing Away"?, 47 KAN. L. REv. 61, 79 (1998) (noting that "two Ku Klux Klan
groups have been particularly active in the area where this murder occurred") (footnote omitted).
42. See Allan Turner, Racial Hate Crimes Sordid Part of State History, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, June 10, 1998, at A10 ("Texas' violent history dates to the late 19th century when it
was among the South's most lynch-prone states. At least 355 people, most of them blacks, died in
Texas mob violence between 1889 and 1918.").
43. See Clarence Page, Optimistic Message About Racial Harmony, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
Feb. 3, 1999, at A20 ("The slayings tended to be community events, sometimes attended by chil-
dren and backed with a distinctively religious zeal by white business, social and political leaders.").
44. See Richard Stewart, Three Indicted by Grand Jury in Jasper Case: Charges of Capital
Murder Face Whites in Black's Dragging Death, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July 7, 1998, at Al.
45. See Patty Reinert, Allan Turner & Richard Stewart, Jasper Killer Gets Death Penalty: A
Smirking King Shows No Remorse, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb. 26, 1999, at Al.
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sentenced him to die.46 On November 18, 1999, an all white Jasper County
jury found Berry guilty of capital murder but sentenced him to life in
prison.4 7
Viewed as a kind of collective injury48 to the integrationist spirit of Jas-
per,49 the Byrd lynching reignited local efforts toward community recon-
ciliationO and interracial reformation.51 The colorblind quality of the state
prosecution fueled those efforts.52 They received additional encouragement
from the altruistic posture of the Byrd family exhibited toward the defen-
dants' families53 and the community at large.54 This display of altruism took
the form of public statements by the Byrd family55 and private lobbying in
46. See Second Man Convicted In Dragging Death, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1999, at A18; Jas-
per Finds Relief in Jury's Sentence: Blacks, Whites Agree Brewer Deserves Death, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Sept. 24, 1999, at A32.
47. See Third Defendant Is Convicted In Dragging Death in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
1999, at A29.
48. See Melanie Coffee, Panel Takes a Hard Look at Hate Crimes: Lawmakers, Victims' Kin
Agree Law Needs to Call for Swift and Severe Penalties, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July 26, 1998, at
A29 ("Hate-filled acts of violence not only intimidate, but damage our collective spirit ... 
(quoting Acting Assistant U.S. Attorney General Bill Lann Lee).
49. See Jim Henderson, East Texas Racism Subtle But Persistent: Blacks Say Fear of Retri-
bution Lets Routine Bigotry Go Unremarked, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 20, 1998, at Al (de-
scri'bing the racial atmosphere of [Jasper] as "among the more enlightened and integrated commu-
nities in a region with a history of stubborn resistance to cultural change").
50. See Richard Stewart, Symbol of Racial Division Tumbles: Jasper Dismantles Iron Fence
that Split Cemetery into Black, White, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Jan. 21, 1999, at A21 (noting that
municipal workers "removed the ancient wrought iron fence that divided the white and black sec-
tions of Jasper City Cemetery").
51. See Clarence Page, Lesson for Others in Jasper's Healing Course, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
MAR. 2, 1999, at A20 ("News accounts in the wake of the unspeakably brutal dragging death of
James Byrd, Jr. describe the East Texas town of Jasper as a place pulling together to heal wounds
that opened long before Byrd's death").
52. See Editorial, Race, Memory and Justice, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1998, at A14 ("In Jasper,
the community has rallied around a sheriff bent on colorblind prosecution of this lynching by
pickup truck.").
53. At capital sentencing in the trial of John William King, Mary Verret, Byrd's sister, ad-
dressed King's father, commenting: "I wanted to say to him we can understand his loss. We can
understand his grief. Our hearts go out to him." White Supremacist Sentenced to Die for Dragging
Death of Black Man in Jasper, 95 JET 13 (1999).
54. See Mark Shaffer, Victim of Hate Promotes Healing, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Mar. 17,
1999, at BI (reporting that Byrd's nephew espoused "a message of racial healing" at an Arizona
civil rights community seminar).
55. An initial statement issued by the Byrd family announced: "Let this horrendous violation
of the sanctity of life not be a spark that ignites more hatred and retribution. Rather, let this be a
wake-up call for America-for all Americans. May it spark a new cleansing fire of self-examination
and reflection." Plea for a Wake-Up Call: Slain Jasper Man's Family Spurns Hatred, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE June 27, 1998, at A29. In a subsequent statement presented to the U.S. Senate Judici-
ary Committee, Renee Mullins, the eldest daughter of James Byrd, exclaimed: "I want all citizens to
pray for these individuals who have such low self-esteem and who are so full of fear and hatred that
they are cut out from the happiness of life." Steve Lash, Prayer, Hate-Crime Bill Urged by
Daughter of Jasper Victim, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July 9, 1998, at Al. Subsequently, Jamie Byrd,
the youngest daughter of James Byrd, observed: "'Why should I hate? That would be what the men
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support of the enactment of then pending Texas hate crimes legislation.5 6
The legislation, titled the James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Act, ultimately failed
to gain passage. 57
However earnest the effort, the absence of federal and state hate crime
prosecution in circumstances of racial violence may thwart community-based
racially reformist practices.8 Such practices may be stymied notwithstand-
ing the "distinctive social meaning" attached to hate crimes.5 9 Dan Kahan
traces that meaning, at once expressive of the social estrangement of the ac-
cused and the inferior status of the victim, to the "modes of killing" hate
crime offenders select, in this case lynching60 Lynching in southern history,
Lu-in Wang mentions, "stands as the archetypal 'hate' crime" whether driven
by economic self-interest or racist hostility.61 In fact, Kahan remarks: "[B]y
tying African-American James Byrd to the bumper of their car and dragging
his body for miles, his white supremacist killers traded on the evocative con-
notations of lynching."62 Without the normative meaning of dignity and
equality supplied by hate crime prosecution, even communities dedicated to
racial reform may be unable to transform the retributive spirit of criminal
trials into the rehabilitative sentiment of group unification.
C. Criminal Justice Norms and Narratives
Criminal justice norms and narratives offer opposing visions of law and
community rooted in punishment and mercy. Derived from federal and state
criminal law, those norms and narratives establish the legitimacy of state pu-
nitive and remedial intervention in the affairs of community. State interven-
who killed my father did, and I'm not like them.... We all need to just stand up and stop all this
violence. I hate that my dad had to be killed for everybody to come together."' Jamie Stockwell,
"Why should I hate? ": Jamie Byrd says it's time to stop the violence, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb.
18, 1999, at A5. See also Richard Stewart, Byrd Family Not Giving up on Passage of Hate-Crimes
Bill, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, May 19, 1999, at A23 (James Byrd Sr., the father of James Byrd,
added: "We want to live together in peace and harmony.").
56. See Kathy Walt, Byrd's Relatives Call on Bush to Get Behind Hate Crimes Bill, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, May 7, 1999, at Al.
57. See Juan B. Elizondo, Jr., Family Says Fate of Byrd Bill Is "Slap in the Face," AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, May 18, 1999, at B1.
58. Newspaper accounts reported that "no federal charges were ever brought because investi-
gators concluded that Byrd's slaying didn't violate federal hate crime laws." Richard Stewart,
Dragged into Infamy: Murder Case Forces Jasper to Revisit Horror of Slaying in June, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Jan. 24, 1999, at Al.
59. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARv. L. REv. 413, 464 (1999)
(footnote omitted).
60. See id.
61. Lu-in Wang, The Complexities of "Hate," 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 831 (1999) (citing
lynching as "the historical antecedent of contemporary 'hate' crimes and the original model on
which contemporary images and understandings of such crimes are based").
62. Kahan, supra note 59, at 464.
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tion to safeguard private rights or public welfare concedes the state-enforced
power to dictate standards of conduct and to command physical compliance.
This sovereign prerogative implies the right to control public and private
space without internal or external interference. Under liberal theory, the
sovereign right of state rule is contingent on popular consent and the deriva-
tive obligation to obey the law. 63
1. How liberal theory shapes prosecutorial visions of law.
The concepts of consent and fidelity shape prosecutorial visions of law,
community, and professional identity. Traditionally, consent and fidelity
ally with a punitive rather than an emancipatory conception of the state. The
consent of the state provides the enabling power for the prosecution func-
tion.64 Fidelity to the state and by extension to society supplies legitimacy to
that function. In this attenuated sense, society affords only a thin conception
of community captured by the inanimate visage of the public, instead of the
enlivened face of the victim or defendant. The centrality of the state to
prosecutorial identity implies a strong adherence to legal positivism. For
law, positivism indicates hard rules of legislative enactment. For commu-
nity, it suggests bright lines of public and private authority. For prosecutors,
it insinuates truncated forms of independence and discretion contingent on
state power. The prosecution function, on this account, demands strict
statutory enforcement and stringent public/private boundary demarcation
without significant discretion or deviation in the realm of norms and narra-
tives, especially when the race of the defendant or victim is on trial.
2. How race upsets the liberal model.
Race disturbs the positivist account of the prosecution function. Indeed,
the race trials of the Central Park Jogger and James Byrd offer two shifting
accounts of that function. The first emerges from the antebellum period in
American law. The second arises out of the postbellum Reconstruction era.
Both accounts define race and determine racial status through the discursive
performance of advocacy.65 Antebellum ideology casts race and racial status
in terms of black natural inferiority and innate moral deficiency. It limits
community to primitive forms of tribal assembly. Postbellum ideology pre-
63. See David Copp, The Idea of a Legitimate State, 28 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 18-31 (1999)
(deploying Hohfeldian rights analysis to explicate the idea of a legitimate state).
64. On the linkage of community consent to the grand jury structure, see Susan W. Brenner,
The Voice of the Community: A Case for Grand Jury Independence, 3 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 67,
67(1995).
65. See Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nine-
teenth-Century South, 108 YALE LJ. 109, 112-13 (1998) (describing the performative discourse of
race in nineteenth-century southern race trials).
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serves this subordinate black image in the gloss of "scientific racism"66 but
concedes a greater sense of subjectivity and community in the form of politi-
cal rights and economic opportunity.
Antebellum and postbellum versions of racial status and community en-
gender uncommon positional conflicts for prosecutors.67 The conflicts
mount over the meaning of race and community in the criminal law. The
source of these conflicts lies outside the text of law. Nothing in the New
York law of sexual assault or the Texas law of murder, for example, triggers
conventional conflicts of interest for the prosecutors in the Central Park Jog-
ger and James Byrd trials. Indeed, the deformities of race and the degenera-
cies of community reside unimpeded by law or ethics in both. The conflicts
come instead from the rival demands of prosecutorial autonomy, public duty,
victim obligation, and state fidelity. To the extent that these demands en-
hance prosecutorial accountability6s to the public and the victim, and in-
crease independence69 from the state, they strain the positivist modelO of
prosecutorial discretion.
3. Discretionary norms ofpunishment.
Both antebellum and postbellum renditions of prosecutorial discretion em-
phasize the norms and narratives of punishment. The norms of punishment
span retribution, restitution, and deterrence. Narratives of punishment carry
66. Ariela Gross notes that "the introduction of a 'scientific' discourse about race into the
courtroom, traces its roots to the well-documented rise of 'racial science' among phrenologists and
medical doctors during [the mid-nineteenth century.]" Id. at 153. Gross points to "evidence from
courtroom battles over racial determination" to "suggest[] that, at least before the Civil War, racial
science was not the predominant way of understanding racial identity." 1d; cf. GEORGE M. FRED-
RICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN
CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914 at 1-2, 71-96 (1971) (asserting that the white American
"belief that black mental, moral, and psychological characteristics were the result of environment
was not effectively challenged in th[e] period [1800-1812] and persisted as a respectable ethnologi-
cal doctrine until the 1830s and 1840s") (footnote omitted).
67. For private and public law positional conflicts, see John S. Dzienkowski, Positional Con-
flicts of Interest, 71 TEx. L. REV. 457 (1993) (classifying litigational, lobbying, and transactional
positional conflicts) and Norman W. Spaulding, The Prophet and the Bureaucrat: Positional Con-
flicts in Service Pro Bono Publico, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1395, 1400-22 (1998) (assessing impact of
positional conflicts on lawyer's autonomy in selecting pro bono work and on the distribution of
public interest legal services).
68. On the principle of moral nonaccountability in criminal and civil paradigms, see DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 50-66 (1988).
69. For a strong defense of lawyer discretion, see William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in
Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1090-19 (1988).
70. For an early outline of lawyer positivism, see William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advo-
cacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 41 (noting that "the law-
yer's ends and his notions of social norms have no relevance" under positivist theory).
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broad claims of epistemic power7l regarding the discovery of fact and the
judgment of blame. Powers of discovery go to the description of legal phe-
nomena: the act of violence, the stunting of class, or the color of skin. Powers
of judgment refer to the interpretation of such phenomena: the quality of guilt,
the incentive of envy, or the racial content of motive. Overbroad claims of dis-
covery earn criticism on the basis of questionable epistemology, for example, in
the unsettled knowledge claims of legal narrative.72 Overstated claims of
judgment invite similar criticism on the ground of unverifiable self-
performance.73 These allied criticisms do not condemn narrative. Even the
defenders of narrative,74 however, seem unwilling to approve the use of narra-
tive archetype and its imprimatur ofjudgment.75 Such archetypal usage may be
found in criminal law narratives, for instance in capital cases where prosecutors
and defense attorneys together participate in the socio-legal construction of the
defendant as monster and mendicant.76
71. Andrew Taslitz offers the notion of epistemic power to explicate cognitive bias. See An-
drew E. Taslitz, Abuse Excuses and the Logic and Politics of Expert Relevance, 49 HASTINGS L.J.
1039, 1059 (1998). Taslitz argues: "Epistemic power arises from judges and jurors bringing pre-
conceptions and cognitive schemes to their task. Those preconceptions and schemes are rooted in
cultural stories and class, race, and gender-based experience. Consequently, members of different
groups often share particular visions of reality." Id. (footnotes omitted).
72. See Richard Delgado, Making Pets: Social Workers, "Problem Groups, " and the Role of
the SPCA-Getting a Little More Precise About Racialized Narratives, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1571,
1579-82 (1999).
73. For a rebuke of self-performance in narrative, see Abbe Smith, Burdening the Least of Us:
"Race-Conscious" Ethics in Criminal Defense, 77 TEx. L. REv. 1585 (1999); see also Anne M.
Coughlin, Regulating the Self. Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholarship, 81 VA. L.
REV. 1229 (1995).
74. For a defense of narrative in the study of race, see Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the
Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process
Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV. 803 (1994); see also Nancy Levit, Critical of Race
Theory: Race, Reason, Merit, and Civility, 87 GEo. L.J. 795, 809 (1999) ("Questioning narrative
methodology as 'unreasonable'-by which is meant 'atypical'-elides the logical and evidential
basis of the questions that critical theorists are asking.").
75. See Backer, supra note 25, at 196 (noting that "[e]ach archetype carries with it judg-
ment!).
76. On capital case narratives, see James M. Doyle, The Lawyers' Art: "Representation" in
Capital Cases, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 417,425 (1996) (noting that "tihe archetypal figure of the
murderer supplies much of the meaning in the prosecutor's representation of the individual on
trial") and Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Dead Man Talking: Competing Narratives and Effective Representa-
tion in Capital Cases, 30 ST. MARY'S L.. 421, 469 (1999) (urging a balance and integration of
competing narratives in defending against the application of state capital punishment statutes); see
also Melissa J. Ganz, Common Sinners and Moral Monsters: The Killer in American Culture, 11
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 517,522 (1999) (reviewing KAREN HALTrUNEN, MURDER MOST FOUL: TBa
KILLER AND THE AMERICAN GomHic IMAGINATION (1998) and mentioning "the ambiguity and
contestation that has characterized the popular response to deadly violence" in American society).
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4. Application ofprosecutorial norms and narratives to the Central
Park Jogger and James Byrd trials.
Archetypal narratives of race flourish in the Central Park Jogger and
James Byrd trials crisscrossing age, class, and gender. The Central Park
Jogger trials depict juvenile black predators wilding77 in an impoverished
urban state of nature. By contrast, the James Byrd trials portray young white
Klansmen lynching in the backwoods of Texas. Apparently, two of the de-
fendants, Bill King and Russell Brewer, "were easy to paint as racist ldll-
ers."T8 Newspapers reported that "[b]oth were ex-convicts and adorned with
white supremacist tattoos."79 In specific, they reported that 'King and
Brewer had joined a Ku Klux Klan splinter group, the Confederate Knights
of America, while in prison together."0 The Byrd "prosecutors used the
tattoos as proof of King's and Brewer's racist beliefs."81 Prosecutors "also
introduced letters by King and Brewer, filled with racist language, to prove
the men had motive to kill a black man."82 A third defendant, Shawn Berry,
lacked the "threatening" tattoos and "racist screeds" intimating the "idea of
racial violence" espoused by King and Brewer.83 For Berry, Jasper County
District Attorney Guy James Gray explained: "Motive in this case is either
one of two things: He lived with these klansmen and developed their way of
thinking, or he's a thrill seeker who got caught up in the killing like he was
in a pack of dogs."84 Narrative predominance of these figures in black and
white signals the historical presence of antebellum and postbellum modes of
racial identity. That presence contains its own imaginative and historic op-
position. As Gary Peller points out, the postbellum rhetoric of racial inte-
gration "has often been radically oppositional, spiritual, and communal."85
In law and lawyering, opposition comes from counter narratives. The
prosecution function deals in archetypal stories and counter stories of crime
77. Wilding is a term coined by the Central Park Jogger trial defendants to describe their
group practice of inflicting random violence on victims-white and black-purely for entertain-
ment. Wilders typically show no remorse for their actions. See CHARLES DERBER, THE WILDING
OF AMERICA: How GREED AND VIOLENCE ARE ERODING OURNAnON'S CHARACTER 1-18 (1996)
(offering variant interpretations of the term).
78. C. Bryson Hull, Final Trial in Jasper Killing Begins Today, AUSTIN AMERICAN-





83. Id.; Richard Stewart, Prison Gang Experts May Testify in Jasper, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
Dec. 10, 1999, at A25.
84. Hull, supra note 78, at BI.
85. Peller, supra note 19, at 812. Peller remarks: "One important dimension of integration-
ism, as it manifested itself in American culture, was the manner in which the goal of racial integra-
tion helped generate an authentic community of people who understood themselves as profoundly
committed to the eradication of racial domination in American society." Id.
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and punishment.86 The stories mediate the norms of legal and moral pun-
ishment. But the separation of law and morality under positivism87 strains
this mediation, generating moral-formal dilemmas that counterpose obliga-
tions to morality against commitments to the state.88
5. Prosecutorial tensions: The problems of competing goals.
The dilemmas confronting the prosecution function under antebellum
and postbellum racial visions stem from tensions internal to the criminal law.
Both federal and state criminal law require the prosecution of wrongdoing
not only to preserve order, but also to safeguard community. Indeed, the aim
of prosecution is to maintain ordered community through punishment. By
design, prosecution operates as an instrument of punitive rectification. Its
object is to deter and to rectify criminal acts that breach the bonds of com-
munity. Criminal statutes and doctrines that combine incarceration and res-
titution exemplify this objective. Rectification, however, nowhere requires
community healing or reconstruction. And yet, reconstructive forms of
community activism long count among the criminal justice traditions of
prosecution and policing.
Consider prosecutor-assisted community policing89 as a means of creat-
ing community.90 Insofar as community-based policing mitigates the unreli-
ability of police intuition in community criminal law-deployment, it may
foster state-community exchange and dialogue. Compare as well the use of
prosecutor-aided police civilian review boards to integrate law and commu-
nity9' through extra-judicial approaches to correcting police prejudice in ex-
86. For illustration of the use of counter stories in the prosecution of police brutality, see
David Dante Troutt, Screws, Koon, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional Narratives in
Federal Police Brutality Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18, 21-22 (1999).
87. On the separation of law and morals under positivism, see H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
88. For elaboration on the moral-formal dilemma facing antebellum judges, see ROBERT M.
COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: AiTSI.AvERY AND THE JUDICuAL PROCESS 197-256 (1975).
89. See Jerome H. Skolnick, Terry and Community Policing, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1265,
1270 (1998) (noting early twentieth-century New York City police-community relations program);
see also Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLrM. L. REV. 551, 576 (1997) (describing community
policing "as a new policing philosophy that draws upon the idea of community-police reciprocity
'to redefine the overall purposes of policing, to alter the principal operating programs and technolo-
gies on which the police have relied, and to found the legitimacy and popularity of policing on new
grounds,").
90. Mary Coombs remarks that community policing, by "maintaining order and preventing
low level disruptions of public space," may contribute to the creation of a "viable community" and
exert an "indirect effect on the rate of serious crime." Mary I. Coombs, The Constricted Meaning
of "Community" in Community Policing, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1367, 1370 (1998) (footnotes
omitted).
91. Sean Hecker observes that civilian review "will improve the accountability of law en-
forcement and the perceived legitimacy of police practices, particularly in minority communities."
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cessive force incidents or in racially-biased pretext stops. Not only do civil-
ian review boards serve a symbolic function of demonstrating state interest in
racial equity and tolerance, the assistance of the prosecution in instituting
community policing promises community through group connection92 and
mercy.93
The promise of prosecution-fostered community under the guide of
mercy flows from the enforcement discretion delegated under federal and
state criminal law.94 Embedded in constitutional, statutory, and common law
domains, that discretion shapes criminal charging95 and influences law en-
forcement custom and tradition.96 Although the prosecutor may intend other-
wise,97 the force of tradition may compel jurispathic98 forms of punishment de-
structive of community (retribution),99 rather than jurisgenerativelo forms of
punishment conducive to community (mercy). Punitive traditions of a retribu-
Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for Civilian Review Boards, 28
COLuM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 551,603 (1997).
92. Christopher Edley declares: 'We should not simply tolerate our racial and ethnic differ-
ences; we should genuinely celebrate them as a source of richness in our lives and a source of
strength in our social and economic endeavors." Christopher Edley, Jr., Color at Century's End:
Race in Law, Policy, and Politics, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 951 (1998).
93. On mercy in the criminal justice system, see JEFFRm G. MuRPHY & JEAN HAMPTON,
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1988); Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain from Heaven" Mercy
in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989 (1996); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum,
Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLuM. L. REV. 269,366-72 (1996).
94. Daniel Richman points to the "extraordinary degree of discretionary authority" delegated
by Congress to federal prosecutors. Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional
Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REv. 757, 763 (1999); see also Dan M.
Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469,479-81 (1996).
95. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L.
REV. 669, 671-82; Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 736-50 (1996).
96. On law-enforced racialized custom and tradition, see Linda Greene, Jim Crowism in the
Twenty-First Century, 27 CAP. U. L. REv. 43, 45 (1998).
97. See Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 1365 (1987) (surveying the role of intent in the constitutional regulation of prosecuto-
rial conduct).
98. Jurispathic forms of state punishment constitute juridical acts of physical and interpretive
violence destructive of conflicting community norms and values. See Cover, supra note 6, at 40-
44; see also Martha Minow, Introduction: Robert Cover and Law, Judging, and Violence, in
NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW, supra note 3, at 1, 1-2 (citing the jurispathic power and
practice of the state that "rules by displacing, suppressing, or exterminating values that run counter
to its own").
99. The individualized nature of jurispathic justice clashes with the aspiration of constitu-
tional community. Animated by retribution, rather than deterrence or restitution, jurispathic visions
ofjustice accept the disintegration of community. Moreover, they hinder and sometimes preclude
the attainment of shared value consensus. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Community and Justice in
Constitutional Theory, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1073, 1073-74.
100. Embodied in the religious tradition and vocabulary of redemption, mercy signifies aju-
risgenerative principle of punishment liberating defendant, victim, state, and society. See Cover,
supra note 6, at 11-44.
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five sort in fact may reflect community norms. 01 At the same time, they may
contravene the constitutional commitment to building a democratic culture of
racial tolerance.0 2 That commitment is weakly implanted in the history of
postbellum reconciliation. The Central Park Jogger and Byrd trials expose the
shallow roots of tolerance in the postbellum culture of racial community. For
the wilding juveniles in the Central Park Jogger case, community intolerance
demands rejection of the mitigating narratives of youthful innocence. For the
southern white supremacists in the Byrd trials, intolerance dictates capital
prosecutions and death sentences. Ironically, in Byrd it is the vengeance of
the death penalty, and the concomitant showing of equal protection, that af-
ford reconciliation.
6. How to achieve the constitutional values of racial tolerance and
equality.
The importance of history to constitutional values seems well-settled.1o3
Carving the value of racial tolerance from postbellum history to renew a
commitment to constitutional community requires more than tightening the
constraints inhibiting prosecutorial overreaching04 in charging decisions un-
der the Double Jeopardy Clause. 0s Neither these constraints nor closer
regulatory supervision of lawyers under criminal statutes,' 06 even with strin-
101. See A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis
of Tradition's Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409, 451 (1999) (noting that
"[t]radition provides a means of gaining greater insight into community norms and expectations and
serves as a reservoir of efficient norms and institutions") (footnote omitted).
102. See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2315 (1997) (arguing
that the American "Constitution is committed to the realization of a democratic culture, even though
constitutional law-and indeed, law generally-cannot realize this goal by its own efforts").
103. See Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 51 (1998) (observing that "history inevitably holds the key to our constitutional values").
104. See Susan R. Klein & Katherine P. Chiarello, Successive Prosecutions and Compound
Criminal Statutes: A Functional Test, 77 TEX. L. REV. 333, 340, 383-99 (1998) (seeking to measure
prosecutorial overreaching by evaluating whether the provable justification for successively prose-
cuting impinges on constitutional values).
105. George Thomas argues that the constitutional safeguard of double jeopardy is tied to a
legislative determination of both substantive and procedural blameworthiness in the enactment of
criminal statutes. See GEORGE C. THOMAS mH, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW 272
(1998).
106. Bruce Green elucidates the regulatory role of the criminal law in supervising profes-
sional conduct. See Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
327 (1998). He observes:
To the extent that criminal law proscribes conduct that is also proscribed by disciplinary
norms, the criminal law allows criminal prosecutors a role, alongside that of disciplinary agen-
cies and others, in enforcing standards ofprofessional conduct. Additionally, criminal law has
a role in defining the standards of professional conduct governing lawyers directly and, by in-
fluencing the drafters of disciplinary rules, indirectly. Finally, criminal law has a collateral
role in the licensing process, in that the commission of a crime may serve as a ground for de-
nying an individual admission to practice law or for suspending or disbarring a lawyer.
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gent administrative enforcement by state bar agencies acting as quasi-
common law courts,107 will prevent the development of moral-formal dilem-
mas in the prosecution of race trials. Like abolitionist lawyers in the
antebellum South,108 prosecutors in race trials confront the dilemma of mixed
loyalties expressed in their fidelity to the state, their duty to the public, their
obligation to the victim, and their desire to pursue "piecemeal reform."o 9
This dilemma is illustrated in the Central Park Jogger and James Byrd trials.
In the Central Park Jogger case, for example, prosecutors seemed flummoxed
by their inability to vindicate New York's punitive interest in deterrence and
retribution, safeguard a divided white and black public, protect the privacy of
the victim, and yet appear colorblind.11o In the James Byrd case, prosecutors
also seemed acutely sensitive to the dilemma of maintaining a race-neutral
state punitive stance in the context of a segregated white and black public. A
quick glance at other advocacy contexts reveals a growing awareness of race-
based dilemmas spawned by divided loyalties.I H
7. Moral-formal dilemmas in the Central Park Jogger and James Byrd
trials.
The trials of the Central Park Jogger and James Byrd illustrate the on-
going contest within the prosecutorial tradition between antebellum and
postbellum visions of racial status and community. Both trials deploy race as
a metaphor.112 In the Central Park Jogger trials, racial identity bisects
classn13 and genderl4 distinctions. In the James Byrd trials, racial identity
intersects with the culture and society of the postbellum South. By repro-
Id. at 331.
107. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law
Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1019, 1055-68 (1998) (contending that regulatory "agencies have be-
come modem America's common law courts").
108. See Alfred L. Brophy, Humanity, Utility, and Logic in Southern Legal Thought: Harriet
Beecher Stowe's Vision in Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp, 78 B.U. L. REv. 1113, 1150-
54 (1998) (contemplating lawyers' perceived "need to remove themselves from participation in a
legal system that treats their clients unjustly").
109. Id. at 1159 (footnote omitted).
110. See SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 49-65, 101-63.
111. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black
Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1030, 1068 (1995) (pointing out that
"questions about the relationship among professional role, group affiliation, and personal morality
arise in many more mundane areas of legal practice").
112. See ANN LAURA STOLER, RACE AND THE EDUCATION OF DESIRE: FOUCAULT's HISTORY
OF SEXUALITY AND THE COLONIAL ORDER OF THINGS 126 (1995) (arguing that "race serves as a
charged metaphor with allegorical weight").
113. See id. at 107 (remarking that "questions of racial identity and class distinction pervaded
the colonial discourses in the Dutch East Indies, French Indochina, British Malaya, and India in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries at different moments but in patterned ways").
114. See Valerie Smith, Split Affinities: The Case of Interracial Rape, in CONFLICTs IN
FEMINISM 271,274-78 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller eds., 1990).
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ducing the normative and narrative hierarchies that give meaning to racial
status and community, the trials reenact the moral-formal dilemmas common
to race trials. Resolving these dilemmas within the framework of prosecuto-
rial tradition requires reconsideration of the meaning of racial status and
community under both antebellum and postbellum regimes. Antebellum
ideology posits a vision of racial community segregated along the barrier
lines of black natural inferiority and moral degeneracy. White crossover,
even in the spirit of uplift and redemption, risks tarnish and retaliation. Post-
bellum ideology endorses this vision of community while affording blacks
limited, integrationist forms of political and economic participation. To the
extent that prosecutorial role, function, and regulation permit the expansion
of crabbed forms of interracial political and socioeconomic participation,
prosecutor-initiated forms of community activism and outreach may be ef-
fective.
II. PROSECUTORIAL ROLE, FUNCTION, AND REGULATION
This Part describes the role, function, and regulation of prosecutors act-
ing under criminal law jurisdictions within both federal and state systems.
The description sorts out the ethics rules and standards that govern prosecu-
torial conduct. Drawing on the Central Park Jogger and James Byrd trials, it
demonstrates that such rules and standards mold multiple prosecutorial roles
with accompanying burdens of freedom and constraint. The multiple roles
evolve in accordance with the responsibilities of constitutional, institutional,
professional, cultural, community, and moral agency. Additional role-
specific contextual responsibilities ensue from considerations of procedural
fairness, organizational efficiency, and substantive justice.
A. Ethics Rules and Standards
The prosecution function is governed by federal and state ethics rules
and standards. Promulgated by the American Bar Association,115 state courts
and bar associations,16 federal courts and advisory groups,117 and the U.S.
Department of Justice,1I8 the rules and standards regulate the prosecution of
criminal cases, including the Central Park Jogger and James Byrd trials. In-
115. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1983); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1995); STANDARDS FOR CRvINAL JUSTICE (1993).
116. See generally NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROS-
ECUTION STANDARDS (1991).
117. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tentative Draft
No. 8, 1997).
118. See generally UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL (1998).
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stead of surveying the anecdotal literature on the prosecution of crimell9 or
rehearsing debates over prosecutorial conflict,120 disqualification,12l unau-
thorized contact122 and misconduct,123 this analysis seeks to link prevailing
ethics rules and standards to the prosecution of racially motivated violence
under the weight of antebellum and postbellum traditions. That weight tips
attention to racial identity and status independent of the adversary system
and its asymnnetry.124 Although regulatory canons acknowledge the import
of prosecutorial power in charging,125 investigation,126 plea bargaining,27
119. See, e.g., EDWARD HUMES, MEAN JUSTICE (1999) (testing in story the claimed inno-
cence of a convicted murderer); WILLIAM T. PizZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR SYSTEM
OF CRIMINAL TRIALS HAS BECOME AN EXPENsIvE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED TO DO TO
REBUILD IT 117-39 (1999) (describing the undermining of truth and the demeaning of profession-
alism wrought by the adversarial battle of the criminal justice system); HAROLD ROTHwAX,
GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1996) (critiquing of the criminal justice system by
a former judge who employs stories from his own courtroom); H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL
JUSTICE: THE FLAWED PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN AMERICA (1996) (using actual cases to call into
question the proposition that the criminal justice process actually produces just outcomes).
120. See Susan W. Brenner & James Geoffrey Durham, Towards Resolving Prosecutor Con-
flicts of Interest, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 415, 468-83 (1993) (examining the nature of prosecutor
conflicts of interest).
121. See Neil W. Hamilton & Kevin R. Coan, Are We a Profession or Merely a Business?:
The Erosion of the Conflicts Rules Through the Increased Use of Ethical Walls, 27 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 57, 76-79 (1998) (tracing erosion of secondary disqualification conflicts rules as applied to
government lawyers moving to private practice).
122. See Jennifer Marie Buettner, Compromising Professionalism: The Justice Department's
Anti-Contact Rule, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 121, 124-42 (1998-99) (delineating conflicts between ABA
Model Rule 4.2 and DOJ rules regarding unauthorized government communication with repre-
sented parties); see also Roger C. Cramton & Lisa Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecu-
tors: The Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. Pri. L. REv. 291, 318-
24 (1992) (discussing federal policies exempting DOJ lawyers from anti-contact rule that otherwise
prohibits lawyers from communicating directly with parties represented by counsel).
123. See Judy Platania & Gary Moran, Due Process and the Death Penalty: The Role of
Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument in Capital Trials, 23 LAW & HUM. BEH. 471, 483
(1999) (reporting that improper statements made by prosecutors in closing argument influence par-
ticipant-jurors' sentence decision-making by increasing the likelihood of death penalty recommen-
dations).
124. See Alan Rogers, "A Sacred Duty": Court Appointed Attorneys in Massachusetts Capital
Cases, 1780-1980, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 440, 465 (1997) (tracing evolution of presumption that
"a compelling case for the defendant's guilt ameliorates the shortcomings of the defendant's court
appointed attorney").
125. On the scope ofprosecutorial charging discretion, see generally KENNETH CULP DAvIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981).
126. See Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the
Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923, 934-74 (1996) (comparing
adversarial and non-adversarial modes ofprosecutorial investigation and arguing that the prosecutor
should play the role of a non-adversarial, neutral fact-finder when acting as an investigator).
127. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U.
CHL L. REV. 50 (1968); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37.
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trial practice,128 and sentencing,129 they attend sparingly to moral incentive130
and racial motive.131 The subjects of moral purpose and racial impetus also
are largely absent from discussions of prosecutorial impropriety132 and disci-
pline.33 That absence may be attributed to the neutral posture of governing
ethics rules and standards.
1. Prosecutorial obligations under the ethics rules and standards.
Early in the twentieth century, the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics
announced the prosecutorial duty "to see that justice is done."134 The Canons
cast the failure to discharge this duty of public prosecution in the shadow of
moral opprobrium, declaring acts of fact suppression and witness sequestra-
tion to be "highly reprehensible."135 This pronouncement resonates in the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct where commentary asserts the
prosecutorial responsibility to serve as "a minister of justice."36 The ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice similarly affirm the prosecutorial obligation
"to seek justice, not merely to convict."'37 Highlighting this justice-seeking
128. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 60-102 (1991) (defining the prosecutor's duty to do
justice at trial).
129. See generally Cynthia Y. K. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Fed-
eral Prosecutor's Expanding Power Over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L. REV.
199 (1997).
130. On the impact of institutional incentives, see generally Kenneth Bresler, "INever Lost a
Trial": When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal Convictions, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETMICS 537
(1996) (objecting to prosecutorial score-keeping and similar competitive behavior); Tracey L.
Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Fi-
nancial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851 (1995) (proposing the use of financial awards to
influence charging decisions and control prosecutorial misconduct occurring at trial); Jeffrey Stan-
den, An Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2 BUFF. CluM. L. REv. 249, 261-
67(1998).
131. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67
FoRDHAM L. REv. 13, 31-38 (1998) (asserting that prosecutorial decisions often discriminate
against African-American defendants and victims, and contending that prosecutors should bear the
responsibility to eliminate racism in the criminal process); Elizabeth L. Earle, Banishing the Thir-
teenth Juror: An Approach to the Identification of Prosecutorial Racism, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1212
passim (1992) (discussing prosecutorial racism and arguing that violation of the rule prohibiting
prosecutors from injecting race into trial always should be identified, even where no remedy exists).
132. See generally Roberta K. Flowers, What You See Is What You Get: Applying the Appear-
ance of Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 Mo. L. REv. 699 (1998).
133. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Pro-
duce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 69, 77-91 (1995) (discussing mechanisms for
disciplining prosecutorial misconduct).
134. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 5 (1908); see also Stanley Z. Fisher, In
Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 215-54
(1988) (endorsing prosecutorial adoption of quasi-judicial role and values).
135. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 5.
136. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1995).
137. STANDARDS FOR CRVMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-1.2 (c) (1993).
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mission, the standards recognize the "critical role" of the prosecutor in the
criminal justice system.138 That role confers "a quasi-judicial position" en-
trusting the prosecutor with the duties of an "administrator of justice."139
Led by "the interest of justice" and emancipated by "broad discretionary
powers," the prosecutor-administrator thus seems unbridled in striving to
attain a higher "quality" of criminal justice.140 The Restatement (Third) of
The Law Governing Lawyers echoes this sense of freedom and aspiration.141
A battery of four norms regulate the prosecutorial freedom to pursue the
mission of public justice. Derived from the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice, and often buttressed by the more prosaic' National Prosecution Stan-
dards, the norms draw upon the concepts of neutrality, prejudice, commu-
nity, and mercy to guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The start-
ing point of discretion is neutrality. From the outset, the ABA standards call
for "proper professional detachment" in the performance of the prosecutorial
role.142 Construing detachment in terms of conflicts of interest, the ABA
urges prosecutors to safeguard their professional judgment and obligations
from the influence of political or personal interests.143 Under these dictates,
"a prosecutor should not allow personal, ideological, or political beliefs to
interfere with the professional performance of official duties."144
The logic of neutrality-deduced self-restraint directs the prosecutorial ef-
fort to curb prejudice in the adversary context of the criminal justice system.
Promulgated to advance this effort, the standards apply broadly to the prose-
cutorial functions of investigation, charging, evidentiary production, jury
argument, and even extrajudicial comment. In the discharge of both investi-
gative and charging functions, the ABA cautions that prosecutors "should not
invidiously discriminate against or in favor of any person on the basis of
race, religion, sex, sexual preference, or ethnicity," whether the person ap-
pears as the defendant or the victim.145 By any measure of neutrality, such
an arbitrary or discriminatory exercise of prosecutorial discretion lies im-
proper.1 46
138. Id. Standard 3-1.2 (c) cmt.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 156 cmt. h (1998).
142. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-1.2 cmt. (1993).
143. Id. Standard 3-1.3(f).
144. Id. Standard 3-1.3 cmt. ("A prosecutor's own interests, of whatever nature, should never
be permitted to have an adverse effect on the professional performance of the prosecutor's official
duties and obligations.").
145. Id. Standard 3-3.1(b) cmt.
146. Id. ("The integrity of the prosecution office is severely if not fatally compromised when
such bias is introduced into the decision-making process; indeed, even the appearance of such a
discriminatory motivation in this setting can hamper the effective operation of the prosecution
function by diminishing respect for the office in the eyes of the public.").
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Similarly, in the production of evidence, the ABA discourages the pres-
entation of "unduly inflammatory" tangible evidence that might "tend to
prejudice fair consideration" by a judge or a jury.147 Also, in arguments to
the jury, the ABA deplores claims "calculated to appeal to the prejudices of
the jury."148 Claims of this kind, evidently "calculated to evoke bias or
prejudice," suffer especially harsh denunciation.149 Likewise prosecutorial
digression from evidence, for example in "[p]redictions about the effect of an
acquittal on lawlessness in the community,"150 and reference to facts outside
the record receive condemnation for heightening "the risk of serious preju-
dice."151 For the same reason, the standards discourage public, extrajudicial
statement "if the prosecutor knows or reasonably should know that it will
have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing a criminal proceeding."152
When, however as here, "the matter of prejudice is itself an issue in a case,"
the standards acknowledge that "reference to the subject in argument would
be appropriate if restricted to the evidence and inferences derived there-
from."15 3
The broad proscriptive sanction against prejudice under the standards
extends beyond the defendant and his compelled proceeding to reach the
greater community of the public. The standards posit the public as a sort of
collective client, defining the client in reference to "the people who live in
the prosecutor's jurisdiction."54 On this definition, prosecutorial fiduciary
and statutory duties run to the people; the exercise of professional judgment
in turn accrues solely for their benefit.155 It is the prosecutor's obligation "to
enforce the rights of the public."56 Curiously, this regulatory obligation ap-
pears race-conscious. Citing the community demographics of "racial, relig-
ious, and ethnic composition" and the benefits of "employing a diverse group
of prosecutors that is reflective of the diversity in the makeup of the prose-
cutor's jurisdiction," the standards encourage "[s]pecial efforts" to recruit
147. Id. Standard 3-5.6(c) cmt.
148. Id. Standard 3-5.8(c).
149. Id. Standard 3-5.8 cmt. ( Where the jury's predisposition against some particular seg-
ment of society is exploited to stigmatize the accused or the accused's witnesses, such argument
clearly trespasses the bounds of reasonable inference or fair comment on the evidence.").
150. Id. Standard 3-5.8 cmt.
151. Id. Standard 3-5.9 cmt. (finding such statements "particularly offensive" injury trials).
152. Id. Standard 3-1.4(a).
153. Id. Standard 3-5.8 cmt.
154. Id. Standard 3-1.3 cmt.
155. Id.
156. Id. Standard 3-1.2 cmt.; see also NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 1.3
cmt. (1991) (asserting that the prosecutor "must place the rights of society in a paramount position
in exercising prosecutorial discretion in individual cases and in the approach to the larger issues of
improving the law and making the law conform to the needs of society").
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"qualified women and members of minority groups for prosecutorial of-
fice."157
The prosecutorial obligation to the community of the public client goes
to the charging decision as well.158 Certain violations of criminal legislation,
according to the standards, "occur in circumstances in which there is no sig-
nificant impact on the community or on any of its members" or in which "the
most serious threat to the security and order of the community" lies else-
where.159 Prosecutorial declination in these circumstances signals neither the
neglect of public duty nor discrimination among offenders.160 To the con-
trary, within the strictures of the standards, the public interest seems "best
served and evenhanded justice best dispensed" by "a flexible and individu-
alized application" of prosecutorial "norms through the exercise of a prose-
cutor's thoughtful discretion."161 Yet, when confronted by community indif-
ference to a serious crime such that "convictions seem quite unlikely, per-
haps because of hostile community attitudes toward the victims," the stan-
dards insist that prosecutors "should nonetheless proceed in the interests of
justice if satisfied that a serious crime has been committed, the offender can
be identified, and the necessary evidence is available."62 In the face of
community division, prosecutorial investigative and charging actions may
"represent more than gestures," indeed "such tactics can successfully alert
the community to wrongdoing and create a community commitment to rec-
tify the offending conditions."163
The vitality of community to the standards, outside of the symbolic im-
port of the jury,164 implicates the norm of mercy as an expression of public
interest in forgiveness and redemption. The standards supply prosecutorial
forms of mercy in the discretion to recommend noncriminal disposition6s
and to seek assistance "in the evaluation of cases for diversion from the
criminal process."166 More generally, they encourage "resort to other cor-
157. STANDARDS FOR CRMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-2.3(d) (1993); see also NATIONAL
PROsECuTION STANDARDS Standard 8.8 cmt. (1991) (contending that the prosecutor's staff "should
represent a cross-section of the local community and statewide legal community including racial,
ethnic, and religious minority groups").
158. STANDARDS FOR CRMNAL JUSTICE Standard 3-3.9(b) (1993) ("The prosecutor may in
some circumstances and for good cause consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute,
notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which would support a conviction.").





164. Id. Standard 3-5.4 cmt. (noting "the jury's symbolic position as representatives of the
community").
165. Id. Standard 3-3.8(a) (discussing "the availability of noncriminal disposition").
166. Id. Standard 3-3.8(b); see also NATIONAL PROsEcurIoN STANDARDS Standard 29.1
(1991) ("The prosecutor should be cognizant of and familiar with all community-based programs to
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rective social processes."167 These processes may include prosecutor partici-
pation in and partnership with grass-roots community organizations devoted
to "the improvement of the criminal justice system." 68 In fact, the standards
drafted by the National District Attorneys Association press prosecutors to
"encourage the formation and growth of community-based organizations in-
terested in aspects of the criminal justice system and crime prevention."69
Of necessity, community formation and growth entails public education.170
At the same time, based on the fear of prejudice, the standards seek to
check the prosecutorial role in sentencing. For example, they urge prosecu-
tors to "avoid introducing evidence bearing on sentencing which will preju-
dice the jury's determination of the issue of guilt."171 Further, by virtue of
his status as a minister of justice, they stress that the prosecutor's "overriding
obligation is to see that justice is fairly done."172 Fairness concerns also af-
fect the presentation of information relevant to sentencing, prompting disclo-
sure of "all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor."173
The same fairness concerns extend to victims. In this respect, the standards
call for the victim-tailored prosecutorial provision of information and expla-
nation, timely notice of proceedings and disposition, and the opportunity to
consult.174 Solicitude toward victims also applies to sentencing where the
"prosecutor can reflect the victim's point of view regarding the appropriate
sentence" in his recommendation.75
2. The current ethical standards.
The prosecutorial effort to meet a higher standard of public justice
through community outreach and public education founders against the cur-
which offenders may be sentenced, referred as a condition of probation, or referred as a diversion-
ary disposition.").
167. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-3.8 cmt. (1993).
168. NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 17.1-.2 cmt. (1991).
169. Id. Standards 37.1, 17.1-.2 cmt. (urging "prosecutors in communities lacking such grass-
roots organizations to consider appropriate ways and means whereby citizen interest in their forma-
tion can be stimulated.").
170. Id. Standard 37.3 cmt. ("The prosecutor should educate the public about the programs,
policies, and goals of his office and alert the public to the ways in which the public may be involved
and benefit from those programs, policies, and goals.").
171. STANDARDS FOR CRMUNALJUSTICE Standard 3-6.1(c) (1993).
172. Id. Standard 3-6.1 cmt.
173. Id. Standard 3-6.2(b).
174. Id. Standard 3-3.2 cmt.; see also NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 26.2
(1991) (encouraging prosecutors to "provide an orientation to the criminal justice process for vic-
tims of crime" and to "explain prosecutorial decisions").
175. See NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 88.1-.4 cmt. (1991).
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rent substance of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.176 The
Model Rules regulate the prosecution function under Rule 3.8.177 The Rule
proclaims four basic prosecutorial mandates. The first pertains to the quan-
tum and temporal quality of prosecutorial evidence. It requires the prosecu-
tor to support his charging decision by probable cause, and to issue timely
disclosure of evidence relevant to guilt or sentencing mitigation, unless dis-
closure "could result in substantial harm to an individual or to the public in-
terest."178 The second mandate refers to the rights of the accused. It directs
the prosecutor to safeguard the right of the accused to obtain counsel, and to
protect the accused from the unknowing waiver of pretrial rights.179 The
third mandate belongs to the adversary system and the relationship of the
prosecutor to defense counsel. It dictates the reasonable exercise of lawyer-
targeted subpoena power to forestall intrusion into the client-lawyer defense
relationship.180 The last mandate concerns pretrial and trial publicity. It in-
structs the prosecutor to prevent prohibited extrajudicial statements of subor-
dinates, and to refrain from extrajudicial comments serving "no legitimate
law enforcement purpose" and tending to increase the likelihood of height-
ening public condemnation of the accused.181
3. How federal criminal intervention hinders prosecutors in fulfilling
their ethical duties.
Neither the text of Rule 3.8 nor the spirit of its internal mandates ad-
vances the norms pronounced in the ABA standards. But for limited conces-
sions to neutrality and prejudice, the rule assigns little import to community
and mercy. Essential to prosecutor-facilitated racial reconstruction, these
two animating norms suffer additional dilution under the pressure of federal
criminal legislation and concurrent federal-state prosecution. Dual federal-state
prosecution rests on a shared jurisdictional conception of cooperative criminal
justice enforcement.182 Although dual prosecutions appear rare,183 the rapid
176. For a deft analysis of the regulatory failure of the justice standard, see Fred C. Zacharias,
Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecuto-
rial Ethics, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 223,249-65 (1993).
177. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 (1995).
178. Id. Rule 3.8(a), (d) & cmt. (commenting that a protective order may be appropriate to
circumstances of substantial harm); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
7-103(A), (B) (1983) (requiring probable cause and timely disclosure of evidence).
179. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 (b), (c) cmt.
180. Id. Rule 3.8(f) & cmt.
181. Id. Rule 3.8(e), (g), & cmt.; see also Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor, the Press,
and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM L. Rlv. 865, 871-78 (1990) (discussing restrictions on extrajudicial
lawyer comment).
182. See Draft Memorandum of Understanding Between the National District Attorneys Asso-
ciation and the Department of Justice, 32 THE PROSECUTOR 28 (1998).
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federalization of criminal law84 encourages federal incursions on state author-
ity.185 Federal criminal cases divert a "disproportionate and unprecedented"
share of federal judicial resources from the civil justice system 8 6 while obtain-
ing mixed results, for instance in combating violent street crime.187 Well-
intentioned attempts to guide intervention and improve these results have
proven of uncertain value.188
Federal efforts to intercede in state law enforcement contexts seem
thwarted by the disjunction in federal and state jurisdictional competence.
Even when appropriate and cooperative, federal intervention in state criminal
justice prosecutions appears jurisdictionally impractical and inefficient. In-
tervention seems impractical because the state enjoys superior expertise in
the design, implementation, and monitoring of local law enforcement initia-
tives. It seems inefficient because the state possesses institutional advan-
tages in terms of economies of scale and start-up costs. The combined im-
practicality and inefficiency of federal remedial intervention affords scarce
opportunity to develop local program initiatives congruent with the grass-
183. See Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Dual Prosecutions: A Model for Concurrent
Federal Jurisdiction, 543 THE ANNALS 72, 77 (1996) (finding that federal prosecutors typically
bring fewer than 150 dual prosecutions per year).
184. See TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, CRMIINAL JUSTICE SECTION, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 5-17 (James
A. Strazzella, Rep., 1998) (reporting a dramatic increase in the number and variety of federal
crimes); Symposium, Federalism and the Criminal Justice System, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 757 (1996)
(same); Symposium, Federalization of Crime: The Role of the Federal and State Governments in
the Criminal Justice System, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 965 (1995) (same).
185. U.S. Department of Justice guidelines authorize federal intervention in criminal civil rights
cases when it advances the "national interest" See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 8-3.000
(1997); see also Robert G. Morvillo & Barry A. Bohrer, Checking the Balance: Prosecutorial
Power in an Age of Expansive Litigation, 32 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 137, 155 (1995) (noting that the
power of federal prosecutors has expanded together with the scope of federal law).
186. Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543
THE ANNALS 39, 46-51 (1996).
187. See Philip B. Heymann & Mark H. Moore, The Federal Role in Dealing with Violent
Street Crime: Principles, Questions, and Cautions, 543 THE ANNALS 103, 108-15 (1996) (rejecting
enhanced federal role in dealing with street violence and drug dealing). See generally G. Robert
Blakey, Federal Criminal Law: The Need, Not for Revised Constitutional Theory or New Congres-
sional Statutes, But the Exercise of Responsible Prosecutive Discretion, 46 HASTINGS L.J 1175
(1995).
188. Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins propose four justifications for prohibition and
intervention under federal criminal law. The justifications spring from the presence of a strong
federal "substantive interest in the suppression of a particular behavior." Franklin E. Zimring &
Gordon Hawkins, Toward a Principled Basis for Federal Criminal Legislation, 543 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL & SOC. SCI. 15, 23 (1996). Derivative of that substantive stake, a second justification
accrues when the "national government has a larger interest in the control of a behavior than do
units of either state or local government." Id. A third justification for federal intervention arises
when there is a distinct federal advantage over state criminal justice systems "in detecting, prose-
cuting, or punishing a particular behavior." Id. A final, corresponding justification for intervention
emerges when state criminal justice systems are "substantially ineffective" in detecting, prosecut-
ing, or punishing wrongful behavior. Id.
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roots norms of community empowerment, education, and mercy. Logisti-
cally better-situated in state prosecutor offices, such initiatives suffer both
diminution and displacement under the imposition of federal intervention.
B. Prosecutorial Roles and Burdens: Freedom and Constraint
Prosecutorial norms and narratives construct multiple roles with accom-
panying burdens of freedom and constraint. The roles clothe prosecutors in
different guises. Among these include the offices of constitutional guardian,
managerial leader, professional champion, cultural advocate, community
agitator, and moral hero. Additional role considerations relate to procedural
fairness, organizational efficiency, and substantive justice. Together, these
contextual considerations dictate the opportunities for and the limits of
prosecutorial discretion. As the following sections demonstrate, proper exe-
cution of prosecutorial discretion is put to the test in cases of racial violence.
1. Constitutional role.
The constitutional role of the prosecutor is animated by both due proc-
ess 189 and equal protection90 values. These values form part of the moral
structure of the Constitution.191 In the Central Park Jogger and James Byrd
trials, the equal protection norms of dignity and equality predominate. The
indignity of rape suffered by the Central Park Jogger is indisputable. But the
humiliation experienced by James Byrd in being spray painted, stripped to
the ankles, and roped to the fender of a pickup truck is unequivocal as well.
Both indignities deny the moral worth of the victims and deprive them of
equal standing in their own communities.192 The attempt to pursue even-
189. John Edwards argues:
The manner in which due process is administered in an open trial by the prosecutor and the
court, as perceived by the public, the jury and the defendant, affects our criminal justice system
more than the outcome of any given trial. Conscientious adherence to due process values gain
for the criminal justice system citizen respect and support by which the system maintains its
moral legitimacy.
John S. Edwards, Professional Responsibilities of the Federal Prosecutor, 17 U. RICH. L. REv. 511,
534 (1983). See also Michael T. Fisher, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and Due Pro-
cess: There's More to Due Process than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1298 (1988) (arguing
that prosecutorial misconduct violates due process regardless of whether the violation is "harmless
error").
190. On the prosecutorial embrace of the equal protection values of racial dignity and equal-
ity, see Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, supra note 4, at 1162; see also Steven D. Clymer, Unequal
Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 675-717 (1997) (reviewing bur-
dens that equal protection places on prosecutors).
191. For an account of the moral structure of the Constitution, see Matthew D. Adler, Rights




handed prosecutions demonstrated by the broad felony indictment of defen-
dants in the Central Park Jogger case and by the capital indictment of all
three white defendants in the James Byrd case highlights the strength of the
constitutional norm of equality.193
More specifically, racial dignity describes the physical and psychological
integrity of the self. 94 Racial equality denotes the egalitarian treatment of
the self by others, private and public.195 For the Central Park Jogger prose-
cutors, dignitary and equality norms applied out of concern for individual
victims of group-inspired racial violence. For the James Byrd prosecutors,
those norms flowed out of sympathy for communities of color. At the trial of
Shawn Berry, for example, prosecutor Guy James Gray remarked: "Up until
[the King and Brewer trials], no Klansman had ever been convicted of
harming a black man. Now they see that a white man can be given a death
sentence for killing a black man."196 That egalitarian sentiment translates
into the prosecutorial commitment to procedural fairness realized in the
even-handed governance of the adversary system. 197 The differential vindi-
cation of private and public rights under that system,198 illustrated by the lack
of civil rights charges in both cases, cabins the prosecutorial role to the det-
riment of the victim and the victim-community in cases of racial violence.
Conversely, the disparate impact of prosecutorial imperatives on the reha-
bilitative function of the juvenile court, 199 shown by the punitive treatment
192. Dan Kahan adverts to the gravity of that denial and the consequent harm to the collective
value of equality. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413,
464-65 (1999) (maintaining that the indignity of hate crime "is visited not just upon the individual
victim, but upon all those who share his defining commitments") (footnote omitted).
193. The authority of the equality norm in the Byrd case animated jury selection in the trial of
Shawn Allen Berry. During voir dire, prosecutor Guy James Gray stated: "The only thing left is
whether there are going to be any blacks left on this jury. It is important. It's good for the commu-
nity, it's good for the nation. It needs to be a representative jury." ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jury Set to
Be Chosen Today, Nov. 5, 1999.
194. See Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, supra note 4, at 1162 (construing the experience
of dignity "as an interior sense of worth and as an exterior acknowledgement of respecf' that "confers
self-esteem and the esteem of others outside the self").
195. See id. (asserting that egalitarian "treatment preserves equal racial standing and safeguards
against discriminatory conduct in private and public transactions").
196. Richard Stewart, Jasper Trial Site Undecided: Venue Arguments to Be Heard Today,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 8, 1999, at Al.
197. See Bruce A. Green, The Ethical Prosecutor and the Adversary System, 24 CRiM. L.
BULL. 126, 145 (1988) (insisting that prosecutors consciously try to act fairly and lawfully despite
the adversary system).
198. See Joan Meier, The "Right" to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt: Un-
packing Public and Private Interests, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 85, 92 (1992) (remarking that the public
prosecutorial role "appropriate in criminal prosecutions that seek to uphold the criminal law and
effect public justice, has less place in contempt prosecutions brought by private litigants to vindi-
cate private rights").
199. See Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Guardian of the Public and/or the Child: Policy Questions
and Conflicts for the Juvenile Court Prosecutor, 18 JUST. Sys. J. 141, 152-54 (1995) (gauging
prosecutorial impact on rehabilitative focus ofjuvenile court system).
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of juveniles in the Central Park Jogger case, enlarges the prosecutorial role to
the benefit of the victim of violence but to the detriment of victim and defen-
dant-community reconciliation in race cases. The shifting dimensions of the
prosecutorial role rests on the hierarchical order struck among the normative
values of neutrality, prejudice, community, and mercy. Antebellum and
postbellum visions of race and racial community align that order through the
prosecutorial exercise of discretion.
2. Institutional role.
The institutional role of the prosecutor relates to the ethical dimension of
his supervisory function within the criminal justice system, particularly in
regard to local community policing. Extending to the supervision of police
conduct in matters of investigation, interrogation, and custody,200 the prose-
cutor's organizational role denotes an institutional turn in the study of the
professions and professional ethics. 201 The institutionalization of the prose-
cutor's supervisory role incites controversies relevant to "ethics at the mid-
level."202 Located at the managerial level of institutional governance, the
ethics of organizational decision-making, incentive and reward structures,
and formal and informal bureaucratic restraints on discretion daily enter the
calculus of prosecutorial regulation.203 In the Central Park Jogger and James
Byrd cases, midlevel ethics issues grew out of prosecutors' institutional su-
pervision of police and sheriff officers, investigators, and experts aiding in
the indictment, arrest, trial, and sentencing of both black and white defen-
dants. In the Central Park Jogger case, for example, midlevel ethics issues
pertained to the institutional supervision of police officers and investigators.
In the James Byrd trials, nidlevel issues concerned the possibility not only of
overreach in the cooperative use of the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Texas, and the F1B,204 but also
200. See SEUMAS MILLER, JOHN BLACKLER & ANDREW ALEXANDRA, POLICE ETHICS 14-
27, 181-207, 209-22 (1997) (exposing ethical issues in police investigation, interrogation, and cus-
tody).
201. See Dennis F. Thompson, The Institutional Turn in Professional Ethics, 9 ETHICS &
BEH. 109, 109 (1999) (highlighting the institutional context of professional ethics); see also Lian
B. Murphy, Institutions and the Demands of Justice, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251, 269-71 (1998)
(examining the relation between institutional virtue and individual responsibility).
202. Thompson, supra note 201, at 110. Thompson's "ethics at the midlevel" refers to "the
vast range of institutions that operate between the worlds of families, friends, and neighbors on one
side and the realm of governments on the other-institutions like hospitals, schools, corporations,
and the mass media." Id.
203. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PrIT. L. REV. 393, 455-58 (1992)
(claiming that a new prosecution ethos may be required to counter the overzealous nature of prose-
cutors).
204. See Carol Christian, Houston FBI Office Devoted Full Resources in Jasper Case: Agency




of abuse in the employment of expert psychiatric witnesses at the sentencing
phase of defendants' capital trials.205
3. Professional role.
The professional role of the prosecutor is also taken up in the exercise of
discretion. Tempered by his status as a minister of justice, the prosecutor
exerts a profound influence on the adjudication of a criminal case,206 no-
where more pronounced than in the context of plea bargaining. Closely tied
to political authority,207 plea bargaining historically served as a power re-
source and a prerogative of the prosecutor. 20 8 The modem prosecution func-
tion expands this historical prerogative to charging, discovery, pretrial mo-
tions, trial practice, and sentencing. Each body of practice entails specific
types of discretion.
Jurisprudentially, two types of discretion seem to predominate: express
or avowed discretion and tacit or concealed discretion. Following the work
of H.L.A. Hart, Anthony Sebok finds express discretion exhibited in the
work of administrative agencies.209 He uncovers tacit discretion in the work
of judges and juries in interpreting statutes and reconciling precedents.210
Within the work of both administrative agencies and judges and juries, Se-
bok like Hart observes a sense of normative competition among norms for
dominant and subordinate positions.211 Of course, normative competition of
this sort occurs within every interpretive practice. As a result of that compe-
tition, certain norms achieve an elevated or privileged status in the practice
of advocacy and adjudication.
205. See, e.g., C. Bryson Hull, Psychiatrist: Brewer Remains Risk to Society, ASSOCIATED
PRESs, Sept. 21, 1999 (citing testimony of the prosecution's expert witness, Dr. Edward Gripon,
describing Brewer as antisocial and a future risk to society).
206. For a comparison of other forms of influence, see Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise &
Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial
Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1377, 1473-74 (1998).
207. See generally Mary E. Vogel, The Social Origins of Plea Bargaining: Conflict and the
Law in the Process of State Formation, 1830-1860, 33 LAW & Soc'Y Rav. 161 (1999) (maintaining
that plea bargaining arose as part of a process to consolidate the political power of elites). Vogel
adds:
The story of plea bargaining suggests that construction of political authority as a basis of
popular support relies not only on legal codes per se but also on practical social arrangements
for interpreting them that create relationships between citizen and state, shape action and
thinking in ways that solidify popular support, and promote acceptance of authority as binding.
Id. at 170 (footnote omitted).
208. See id. at218-19.
209. Anthony J. Sebok, Finding Wittgenstein at the Core of the Rule of Recognition, 52 SMU
L. R V. 75, 99-102 (1999).




Prosecutorial traditions of discretion furnish the background for the in-
ternal value competition between antebellum and postbellum visions of racial
status and community. Although each vision is impoverished by its essen-
tializing construction of race, postbellum ideology at least affords the aspira-
tion of community, albeit muted. The prosecution function involves the dis-
cretionary application of this community norm for jurispathic and jurisgen-
erative purposes.212 In either event, the result resembles an act of normative
privileging. Unlike the jurispathic discretion exerted in the defense lawyer's
community-decentered, paternalistic representation of clients with disabili-
ties,213 prosecutorial jurisgenerative discretion privileges the norm of victim-
centered community in association with the value of defendant-extended
community.214 This type of discretion dictates whether the prosecutor will
forsake or safeguard a victim's rights and whether he will reconcile the vic-
tim's rights with the obligations of mercy toward a defendant and his ex-
tended community. At the trials of the Central Park Jogger and James Byrd,
protecting such rights contextualizes both the victims' lives, in death and in
recovery, and the defendants' lives, in isolation and in community. Contex-
tualizing the victim honors the dignity of the person and her place in the so-
cial order of a community. Conversely, contextualizing the defendant expli-
cates his isolation and recasts his history of alienation, thereby reconfiguring
his location in a community and furnishing an opportunity for atonement and
forgiveness.215 In this way, community norms give rise to a discretionary
duty to teach the jury and the public about the realities of the racially segre-
gated worlds inhabited by the victims216 and the defendants.217
212. For definitions of these terms, see notes 98-100 supra and accompanying text.
213. See Josephine Ross, Autonomy Versus a Client's Best Interests: The Defense Lawyer's
Dilemma When Mentally Ill Clients Seek to Control Their Defense, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1343,
1368-81 (1998) (finding paternalism inherent in surrogate decisionmaking).
214. Prosecutorial integration of victim-centered and defendant-extended community norms
transverses conventional boundaries dividing the prosecution and defense function. Compare Rob-
ert P. Mosteller, Victims' Rights and the United States Constitution: An Effort to Recast the Battle
in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1698-1704 (1997) (maintaining that expansion of victim-
centered participatory rights may result in unfairness to the accused and illegitimate prosecutorial
skewing of the jury trial process) with Kim Taylor-Thompson, Effective Assistance: Reconceiving
the Role of the Chief Public Defender, 2 J. INST. STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 199, 212 (1999) (urging
public defenders to "develop[] partnerships with communities to create less retributive approaches
to the problem of crime").
215. The notion of redemption here differs from Sumi Cho's theory of "racial redemption" as
a psycho-social and ideological process through which whiteness maintains its fullest reputational
value. See Sumi Chow, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Early Warren, Brown,
and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73, 75 (1998).
216. See Myrna S. Raeder, The Social Worker's Privilege, Victim s Rights, and Contextual-
ized Truth, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 997 (1998) (recommending contextualized storytelling
"[b]ecause the victim's reality may not be the same as that of the jurors, nor may their values be
shared or even understood by the jurors without such information").
217. See Austin Sarat, The Cultural Life of Capital Punishment: Responsibility and Repre-




The cultural role of the prosecutor is tied to the restoration of commu-
nity. In the Central Park Jogger and James Byrd trials, prosecutors often
confined their community teaching to lessons of scientific racial subordina-
tion and prophylactic racial segregation. These pedagogic narratives situated
white and black agents of racial violence in milieus of cultural and social
pathology. Outside of those settings, according to the narratives, white su-
premacists and black juveniles require preventive segregation, even death.
At the trial of Lawrence Russell Brewer, for example, prosecutor Guy James
Gray described Brewer as a "racist psychopath,"218 asserting that Brewer
"would surely inflict violence again if he were allowed to go on living-even
behind bars."219 Likewise, at the sentencing phase of John William King's
trial, prosecutor Pat Hardy argued: "By giving Mr. King a life sentence,
you're giving him at least 40 years to catch a black guard, a black nurse, a
black doctor, a Jewish guard, a Jewish nurse, a Jewish doctor, or anybody
else. You're giving him a chance to catch anybody ... who doesn't believe
in his satanic racist views."220 The Byrd defendants contributed to this nar-
rative construction of irrevocable pathology. In a statement released by his
defense team, John William King declared: "Though I remain adamant
about my innocence, it's been obvious from the beginning that this commu-
nity would get what they desire .... So I'll close with the words of [Nazi
doctrine author] Francis Yockey: 'The promise of success is with the man
who is determined to die proudly when it is no longer possible to live
proudly.'"221
Teaching such lessons, whether or not distorted, manufactures con-
flicts222 that bear heavily on the cultural role of the prosecutor. Although
culture may constitute a "meta-system, immutable in its totality," it is
(asserting the responsibility to discuss the causes of crime); Austin Sarat, Recapturing the Spirit of
Furman: The American Bar Association and the New Abolitionist Politics, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 5, 12-22 (1998) (urging death penalty defense lawyer narratives that educate jurors about
the immorality of death sentences).
218. Jury in Jasper Case Weighs Man's Fate, Jurors Weigh Fate of Byrd's Convicted Killer,
AUSTIN A ERICAN-STATESIAN, Sept. 23, 1999, at B6.
219. Bruce Tomaso, Jury Reaches No Verdict on Jasper Killer's Fate. Deliberations Halt Af-
ter 12 Hours, to Resume Today, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Sept. 23, 1999, at A33. See also Jury in
Jasper Case Weighs Man's Fate, supra note 218, at B6 ("Under the circumstances of this case,
obviously there is a serious need to protect future victims from this man.").
220. Clara Tuma & The Associated Press, Texas Dragging Death Murderer Sentenced to
Death, COURT TV ON LINE, Feb. 25, 1999.
221. Id.
222. For speculations on victim-centered conflicts of interest, see Walker A. Matthews, III,
Proposed Victims' Rights Amendment: Ethical Considerations for the Prudent Prosecutor, 11 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHiCs 735,744-47 (1998).
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marked by "indeterminacy and fluidity," even play.223 Doubtless, given its
capacious sweep, culture "informs both law and morality."224 The prosecu-
tor's cultural function is to reinvigorate law and morality with the virtue of
victim- and defendant-centered community. Virtue comes not simply from
the pursuit of freedom in a collectivity,225 but from the preservation of the
moral character of a community. In early American history, preservation
rested on the "primacy of local custom."226 Yet, custom may conflict with
the prosecutorial commitment to substantive justice. Manifested in the de-
cree that "justice shall be done,"227 this commitment is often equated with the
public interest228 tailored to both criminal and civil ends.229 The Central Park
Jogger and James Byrd trials juxtapose cultural commitments to segregated
and integrated visions of community justice. In the Central Park Jogger case,
prosecutors, criminal defense lawyers, the defendant families, and their
community supporters insinuated a commitment to a segregated vision of
community justice. In the James Byrd trials, Byrd's family and the Jasper
community intimated a sense of cultural confidence in an integrated vision of
community justice. For instance Jamie Byrd, the youngest of Bird's daugh-
ters, sounded the theme of connection and integration in public commentary:
"Everyone needs to just come together and forget about black and white, and
we're all the same inside. We have the same blood."230 Furthermore, Texas
prosecutors depicted the Byrd lynching as a threat to community integration,
describing the killing as "a racially-motivated publicity event King and
223. Backer, supra note 25, at 192. Backer also notes that "[o]ulture acts as a meta-system
because it contains within it all possibilities, all combinations possible, given the set of basic as-
sumptions that define a group as 'distinct."' Id.
224. Ronald 3. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Chrysanthemum, the Sword, and the First Amendment:
Disentangling Culture, Community, and Freedom of Expression, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 905, 907 (foot-
note omitted).
225. See generally THOMAs L. PANGLE, THE ENNOBLING OF DEMocRAcY: THE CHALLENGE
OF THE POSTMODERN ERA 105 (1992) ("To be free is to be, not an independent individual, but the
citizen of a polity in which one has direct access to, or at the very least eligibility to participate in,
sovereign office and the deliberations that authoritatively shape communal life.").
226. Bruce Frohnen, The Bases of Professional Responsibility: Pluralism and Community in
Early America, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 931, 953 (1995). Frolmen notes as well that "lawyers had
a special duty to read and apply statute and custom so as to maintain the community's proper char-
acter." Id. at 954.
227. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). The Berger Court comments that "[i]t is
as much [the prosecutor's] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." Id.
228. See Vera Langer, Public Interest in Civil Law, Socialist Law, and Common Law Systems:
the Role of the Public Prosecutor, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 279, 304 (1988) (remarking that prosecutors
in civil and common law systems "possess inherent authority to protect and further the public inter-
est in civil proceedings").
229. See generally James A. Trowbridge, Restraining the Prosecutor Restrictions on Threat-
ening Prosecution for Civil Ends, 37 MAINE L. REV. 41 (1985) (evaluating prosecutorial practice of
bargaining for waiver of civil liability).
230. Ann Curry, Jamie Byrd Talks About Litfe After Gruesome Racial Murder of Her Father,
James Byrd Jr., TODAY NBC NEws, May 18, 1999.
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Brewer staged to launch their own fledgling hate group, the Texas Rebel
Soldiers, a branch of the Confederate Knights of America the two men joined
in prison."231 Neither of these racialized commitments fully actualizes a
community-oriented prosecutorial role.
5. Community role.
The community role of the prosecutor emanates from the attempt to ad-
vance the common good and to renew public trust by treating a violence-
scarred community itself as a victim.232 The role of community trustee re-
stricts the prosecutor's right to unfettered use of his powers in deference to
the common good, however vague and contested.233 This trustee function
may be derived from social contract theory, though, as Anita Allen points
out, the contractarian rationale in law sometimes "masks judicial and other
governmental coercion in a cloak of consensualism and rational self-
interest."234 Alternatively, the trusteeship function may be deduced from
relational contract theory. On this reasoning, the prosecutorial function be-
comes allied in a relational covenant with a community.235 Plainly, this alli-
ance requires trust and reciprocity. But it is unclear whether the law's nor-
matively supportive function236 may satisfy those requirements. That func-
tion seems especially material to a "community-level explanation of' the
causes of crime and a commitment to preventing crime.237 Certain commu-
nity-level characteristics may ensure that commitment, such as friendship
networks, community-level group supervision, and individual participation in
formal neighborhood organizations.38 These arrangements may transform
231. Bryan Robinson, Second Texas Dragging Defendant Gets the Death Penalty, COURT TV
ON LUNE, SEPT. 23, 1999.
232. For a discussion of the impact of crime on communities, see Katie Long, Community In-
put at Sentencing: Victim's Right or Victim's Revenge?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 187,201-08 (1995).
233. On the tension between the public interest and the common good for the government
lavyer, see Elisa E. Ugarte, The Government Lawyer and the Common Good, 40 S. TEx. L. REV.
269, 274-78 (1999).
234. Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 1, 15
(1999). Anita Allen endorses "the idea of the social contract as a source of legitimate and consen-
sual authority." Id. at 5.
235. See Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, and Rela-
tional Contract, 77 N.C. L. REv. 551, 608-19 (1999) (discussing reciprocity and relationships in
contract doctrine).
236. See id. at 630-33 (lauding view "that one function of the law is to support existing social
norms').
237. For a useful discussion of community commitment in understanding and preventing
crime, see Interdisciplinary Program Series Transcript, The New Chicago School: Myth or Reality?,
5 U. Cal. L.S. ROUNDTABLE 1, 8 (1998) (quoting Tracey L. Meares); cf. Kim Taylor-Thompson,
Effective Assistance: Reconceiving the Role of the Chief Public Defender, 2 L INST. STUD. LEGAL
ETHICs 199, 211-20 (1999) (outlining a community-oriented role for public defenders).
238. See Interdisciplinary Program Series Transcript, supra note 237, at 8 (quoting Tracey L.
Meares); see also Michael Tom-y, Public Prosecution and Hydro-Engineering, 75 MiNN. L. REV.
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the prosecutor into a different sort of "people's warrior,"239 one who is cen-
tered less on punitive sanctions and more on the "promotion of social organi-
zation."240 That transformative role recasts the prosecutor as an agent of for-
giveness and mercy, rather than retribution. In the Central Park Jogger and
the James Byrd trials, prosecutors declined to serve as state agents of mercy
espousing an ethos of community constituted by atonement, forgiveness, and
reparation.241 Instead, they pursued traditional practices ofjurispathic prose-
cution driven by penal norms of victim punishment and community venge-
ance, thereby squandering the opportunity for moral leadership.
6. Moral role.
Public enunciation of the norms of mercy and forgiveness in the context
of community gives rise to a moral prosecutorial role. This is a heroic role
that prosecutors should strive to fulfill. The moral role of the prosecutor
stems from his participation in the jurisgenerative practice of discretion. En-
gagement in the moral practice of law depends on the lawyer's exercise of nor-
mative freedom and autonomy within that practice. Traditionally, the prosecu-
tor's role offers sparse autonomy outside of the racialized antebellum and post-
bellum performance of state fidelity.
Discussing the possibility of moral action in law, Thomas Morawetz
contends that the exercise of autonomy within a practice requires "resisting
physical, psychological, and conceptual coercion."242 To Morawetz, this ex-
perience of autonomy derives from "engage[ment] in self-questioning, en-
tertaining alternative arguments and points of view."243 Indeed, for
Morawetz, "it makes no sense to look for autonomyfrom the practice, any
more than it makes sense to seek autonomy from life itself."244 Instead,
Morawetz's form of autonomy emphasizes the internal by requiring self in-
quiry. A lawyer engaged in such an inquiry might experience a tension char-
971, 973 (1991) (urging closer prosecutorial ties to neighborhoods and local resident priorities and
policies).
239. See Martin H. Belsky, On Becoming and Being a Prosecutor, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1485,
1491 (1984) (reviewing DAVID M. NISSMAN & EDWARD HAGEN, THE PROSECUTION FuNcrION
(1982)).
240. Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms oj) Order in the Inner City, 32 L.
& Soc'Y REv. 805, 812 (1998) ("Law enforcement policies should have as a goal the promotion of
social organization-both the structural and cultural components of it-where the social processes
that it comprises are weak.").
241. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Forgiveness Disrupts Legal Order, 4 GRAVEN IMAGES: J.
CuLTuRE, L., & SACRED 127, 131-34 (1998) (exploring the political and theologic practices of
communities constituted by forgiveness).
242. Thomas Morawetz, Law as Experience: Theory and the Internal Aspect of Law, 52 SMU
L. REV. 27, 66 (1999).
243. Id. at 66.
244. Id. (emphasis in original).
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acterized by a "struggle both with others who see things differently and
would bring about what we see as an inimical state of affairs, and with our-
selves to the extent that we question our own point of view and try out those
of others."24S
The struggle for autonomy in lawyering reflects the engagement in prac-
tical moral reasoning. Ideally, the prosecutor's ability to integrate moral
considerations into legal reasoning and decision-making will cultivate moral
character for the self, society, and the state. 246 In the James Byrd trials, para-
doxically, the prosecutor's moral discourse of punishment and retribution
contributed to the reconciliation of long-segregated communities in Texas
and abroad. The paradox of the James Byrd trials lies in the emergence of
community reconciliation through the moral discourse of colorblind equality
in punishment, both in the deterrence of death and in the retribution for a life
unjustly taken. Declaiming the equality of punishment and the impartiality
of retribution at the trial of Lawrence Russell Brewer, prosecutor Guy James
Gray remarked: "I don't like the death penalty, but that's what he deserves.
The just punishment for his case and these facts and circumstances is
death."247 Reiterating his colorblind faith, Gray added: "There was never a
worry that an all-white jury wouldn't do the correct thing. It just doesn't
matter who the victim is. A murder is a murder."248
I. (RE)CONSTRUCTNG INTERRACIAL COMMUNITY
This Part explores methods of reconceiving the antebellum and postbel-
lum norms and narratives of criminal prosecution deployed in cases of racial
violence. Such a reconsideration might ultimately result in reconstructing
interracial community. The exploration considers the cultural and societal
impact of such norms and narratives in combating the varied forms, contexts,
and categories of racial violence like those illustrated in the cases of the
Central Park Jogger and James Byrd. Additionally, it assesses the potentially
fruitful relationship of lawyers to community, citing examples from contem-
porary law reform movements that mobilized community organization
around civil rights, welfare rights, women's rights, and gay/lesbian rights.
Further, it evaluates the compatibility of prosecutorial norms and narratives
with the emerging jurisprudence of race in American law, particularly the
notions of postmodern racial identity and community.
245. Id.
246. For a discussion of the individual and national character-building effect of constitutional
commitments, see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 47-51
(!999).
247. Paul Duggan, Second Conviction in Dragging Death: Former Leader of White Suprema-




A- Cultural and Societal Impact
The cultural and societal imprint of the norms and narratives of tradi-
tional prosecutorial discretion on the assorted forms, contexts, and categories
of racial violence resists easy description. To gauge some rough measure of
their impact on community values and discourses, this analysis distinguishes
material and interpretive forms of violence. Moreover, it endorses a recon-
sideration of public and private violence. Lastly, it connects the categories
of racial, gender, ethnic, and gay/lesbian violence.
1. Material and interpretive forms of violence.
Prosecutors confront multiple forms of violence. Often, these forms of
violence are linked to a wide array of defendant-infected causes ranging from
impulsive aggression 249 to neurobiologic2sO disorders and psychopathol-
ogy.25' The consequences of these varied mental states can be found in the
material violence of hate crimes,252 and in the interpretive violence of hate
speech. Both forms of violence infect the Central Park Jogger and James
Byrd trials. Consider the material violence of rape in the Central Park Jogger
case. Given the nature of the crime, New York prosecutors were freed from
having to address the doctrinal distinctions between fraud and coercion,53 or
the evidentiary demands of resistance 254-the usual statutory elements of
rape. Instead, they introduced evidence of the mental state of the individual
defendants.255 This seemingly mundane act evoked the scientific determin-
249. See Ernest S. Barratt & Laura Slaughter, Defining, Measuring, and Predicting Impulsive
Aggression: A Heuristic Model, 16 BEHAV. SCL & L. 285, 297 (1998) (linking impulsive aggres-
sion "to low verbal information processing skills but not significantly to the personality traits of
impulsivity or anger/hostility").
250. See Mitchell E. Berman & Emil F. Coccaro, Neurobiologic Correlates of Violence:
Relevance to Criminal Responsibility, 16 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 303 passim (1998) (reviewing studies
linking neurotransmitter functioning, adult aggressive behavior, and violent crime).
251. See Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, Antisocial Personality Disorder and Psy-
chopathy: Diagnostic Dilemmas in Classifying Patterns of Antisocial Behavior in Sentencing
Evaluations, 16 BEHAv. SCI. & L. 333, 340-41 (1998) (finding antisocial personality disorder as
"not invariably associated with criminality" and psychopathy screening protocol "as a more reliable
construct of both maladaptive personality features and socially deviant behaviors that may be rele-
vant to determinations of recidivism and violence risk assessment both in and out of an institutional
setting").
252. See generally VALERIE JENNESS & KENDAL BROAD, HATE CRIuMES: NEW SOCIAL
MOVEMENTs AND THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE (1997) (discussing hate crimes as a social problem);
Frederick M. Lawrence, The Punishment of Hate: Toward a Normative Theory of Bias-Motivated
Crimes, 93 MIC. L. REV. 320 (1994).
253. See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 39
(1998) (surveying statutory elements of rape by fraud and coercion).
254. See Michelle L Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953,
991-1008 (urging that resistance be considered evidence of both nonconsent and force).
255. Andrew Taslitz observes:
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ism of eugenics256 prevalent during the early postbellum period, now veiled
behind modem racial masks.257 The same evidence divulged class-based
antagonisms and motivations common to postbellum race relations.258
Postbellum ideology reemerged in the James Byrd trials when the Texas
prosecutors submitted evidence of white supremacist hate speech. Admitted
to establish motive and state of mind, the evidence of a defendant's racial
invective essentializes not only the white-other, but his community and cul-
ture as well.259 Consider, for example, the proffered photographs of John
William King's racist tattoos: "Nazi SS symbols, satanic stars, the symbol of
a white supremacist group, and the lynching of a black man."260 Although
legitimately introduced to establish King's adherence to "racist ideology,"
the evidence overwhelms the juridical and social construction of King's
character and color, reducing him to a one-dimensional cultural figure that
prosecutors likened to "Adolf Hitler."261 The very act of proffering evidence
of hate speech in a race trial exacerbates postbellum stereotypes: white and
black. The resulting impact disproportionately harms black males.262
A broader conception of relevance recognizes that mental state determination is not a realist
endeavor but an interpretive act. Such an act requires empathy, understanding in an emotion-
ally powerful way the defendant's life story. But empathy requires multiplicity rather than
linearity, knowing and feeling the many truths simultaneously present in a single human life.
Taslitz, supra note 71, at 1067. Extending this observation, mental state determinations imply not
scientific objectivity but the subjectivity and bias of competing cultural and social norms.
256. For useful background on eugenics theory, see generally, ALLAN CHASE, THE LEGACY
OF MALTHUS: THE SOCIAL COSTS OF THE NEW SCIENTIFIC RACISM (1977); MAROUF ARIF
HASIAN, JR., THE RHETORIC OF EUGENICS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN THOUGHT 51-71 (1996); DANIEL
J. KEvLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY (1985);
EDWARD J. LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE DEEP SOUTH (1995); Gregory
Michael Dorr, Principled Expediency: Eugenics, Naim v. Nain, and the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J.
LEGALHIST. 119 (1998).
257. See RICHARD MAJORS & JANET MANCINI BILLSON, COOL POSE: THE DILEMMAS OF
BLACK MANHOOD IN AMIERICA 55-66 (1992) (tracing the cultural genesis of black masking and
acting as a model of black masculinity).
258. See JACK M. BLOOi, CLASS, RACE AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1987). Bloom
observes:
It was not merely prejudice, hatred, or entrenched customs that stood in the way of blacks'
being treated as humans, but also the vested interest of the agrarian elite. This class had mobi-
lized for massive resistance to segregation to defend its own power and position in the name of
the whole white population of the South. Black victory meant the defeat of this class.
Id. at 214.
259. See Backer, supra note 25, at 193 (noting that "the politics of struggle, like that of he-
gemony, militate strongly in favor of essentializing the 'other' and that other's culture").
260. Clara Tuma, supra note 220.
261. Patty Reinert, Racist Guilty of Jasper Murder: Jury Convicts Supremacist in 2 Hours,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb. 24, 1999, at Al.
262. For a useful discussion of the disparate impact of stereotyping on black males, see
Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1271, 1271-87 (1998) (cataloging police use of racialized stop and frisk prac-
tices in black communities); see also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Sus-
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2. Spatial geography of violence.
Prosecutors confront the contexts and spatial geography of violence in
both public and private acts.2 63 Because acts of violence envelop public and
private space, hard and fast jurisprudential distinctions remain elusive. For
some, the public/private distinction hinges on the actual control exerted over
social space,264 at least when traceable to governmental or non-governmental
authority.265 The violence common to the Central Park Jogger and James
Byrd cases occurred in public spaces weakly controlled by the state: a
wooded park and a country road. Within that space, unlike the Central Park
Jogger and her assailants, James Byrd and his executioners engaged in a pri-
vate interchange: hitchhiking. Yet, the private nature of the interaction fails
to erase the public quality of his lynching. More intimate, prolonged forms
of private interchange similarly may fail to transcend the public setting of
violence.266
Under antebellum and postbellum models of prosecutorial discretion, lo-
cating violence in the geographic terms of private and public space rests in
part on evidentiary and evaluative judgments about the racial character of the
actor and the act. In regard to the actor, character evaluations of defendants
and victims rely on reputation.267 Because evidentiary determinations of
reputation entail normative assessment 268 of the virtue of the actor269 and of
pect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 215 (1983) (addressing the "permissible components of probable cause and
reasonable suspicion").
263. See Robert Weisberg, Private Violence as Moral Action: The Law as Inspiration and
Example, in LAW's VIOLENCE 175, 175-210 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992)
(pointing to the violence committed by private individuals against each other as an act of law en-
forcement by the perpetrator). Weisberg adverts to the "important moral and jurisprudential signifi-
cance to the observed analogy between public and private acts of legal enforcement," yet he contro-
verts that analogy problematizing the conjunction between public legal authority and private reme-
dial violence. Id. at 192, 209. For prosecutors, the discernment of public and private acts of vio-
lence may prove elusive.
264. See Kam C. Wong, Black's Theory on the Behaviour of Law Revisited Il: Law as More
or Less Governmental Social Control, 26 INT'L J. Soc. L. 365, 387 (1998) (citing the "central rela-
tionship between social space and social control").
265. See id. (positing "meaningful differences between governmental v. non-governmental
social control").
266. See James E. Robertson, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in United States Prisons: Sex-
ual Harassment Among Male Inmates, 36 AM. CRaM. L. REv. 1, 5-19 (1998) (describing inmate
sexual harassment).
267. See Elizabeth Lutes Hillman, The "Good Soldier" Defense: Character Evidence and
Military Rank at Courts-Martial, 108 YALE L.J. 879, 881 (1999) (commenting that "permitting the
introduction of good military character evidence during the guilt phase of a court-martial ... en-
courages factfinders to focus on the reputation of accused individuals rather than on their alleged
criminal acts").
268. See Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of
Judgment in the Criminal Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1435 (1998) (reviewing JAMES Q. WILSON,
MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? (1997) and can-
vassing the revival of interest in evaluative approaches to criminal law theory).
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the reasonableness of the act,270 they harbor susceptibility to capricious-
ness. 271 Both assessments in fact depend on the unstable interpretive catego-
ries of race 272 and violence,273 rather than some uniform evidentiary proto-
Col.274
3. The connection between sexual violence and race.
Prosecutors encounter multiple categories of violence interlacing race,
gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and even age. In the cases in which
race constitutes a main element of this confrontation, prosecutorial interpre-
tation becomes saturated by colonial and post-colonial era fantasy.275 Rein-
269. See Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1423, 1423 (1995) (ar-
guing that the criminal justice system assesses inculpation according to judgments about the virtue
of the defendants).
270. See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and
Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1994) (exploring the argument that it is reason-
able for criminal defendants claiming self-defense to consider race in assessing the risk of violence
posed by an assailant); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Con-
ception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367,369 (1996) (examining the issue of self-defense
through the lens of socially constructed stereotypes about race).
271. See, e.g., Darcy F. Katzin, The Relevance of "Execution Impact" Testimony as Evidence
of Capital Defendants' Character, 67 FORDHAM L. Rnv. 1193, 1211-14 (1998) (calling for uni-
formity in capital penalty trial evidentiary determinations).
272. Depictions of the culture of the black underclass, particularly its black male denizens,
depends on factual predicates susceptible to bias. See Evan Stark, Black Violence: Racism and the
Construction of Reality, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 433, 435 (1994) ("The problem with the portrait
of an underclass of violent, drug-abusing black males is that its primary source-figures on the
numbers of black males arrested and imprisoned for violent crimes-may itself be the product of
racial discrimination.").
273. Sex offender statutes, and more recently sexually violent predator laws, indicate an in-
terpretive shift from the analytic category of psychopathology to the literary category of monster.
See Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Penology, 4 PSYCHOL.,
PUB. POL'Y, & L. 452, 467 (1998) ("Sex offenders are the embodiment not of psychopathology,
with the potential for diagnostic and treatment knowledge to provide better controls over such of-
fenders, but of the monstrous and the limits of science to know or change people.").
274. Efforts to devise a formal protocol for the admission of group character evidence under-
estimate the racialized construction of character. See Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics
in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 461 (1996).
275. See, e.g., Grant Farred, The Prettiest Postcolonial: Muhammad Ali, in BOYS:
MASCULITES IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 151-70 (Paul Smith, ed. 1996). Farred explains:
In its 1960s manifestation, identity turned mainly on the issue of naming-the name to which
an individual or nation responds; the name that such an entity independently assumes after
having renounced an earlier, imposed one; the status afforded an individual or a nation by the
local or world community. Whether or not that new name was respected and the different
place the subject assumed in the world before and after its new political character was adopted
were vitally important issues.
Id. at 157.
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scribed in antebellum and postbellum sensibilities, the colonial mindset de-
values and sometimes denies the reality of racialized sexual violence.276
Sexual violence against women, like racial violence, is culturally insinu-
ated into masculine identity.77 The Central Park Jogger case connects ra-
cialized sexual violence to the experience of masculinity.278 Prosecutors
forged this connection from the defendants' confessional narratives of
rape.279 Imposed here without intimacy,280 the act of violence (gang rape)
symbolized the "absolutely masculine subject-position"28l of the young male
defendants. To the defendants, the rape denotes their entry into selfhood and
self-possession by asserting the claim of "masculine privilege in relation to
white women."282 This privilege of racialized sexual violence against
women owes more to antebellum black myth than to the contemporary cul-
ture of masculinity.283
Prosecutors of gender-motivated violence may best understand mascu-
lihe violence against women in terms of two categories: violence committed
by strangers and violence committed by intimates.284 The racialized sexual
276. The colonial mindset survived to mediate the dynamics of law and culture during the
antebellum and posthellum periods. See Nancy L. Cook, In Celia's Defense: Transforming the
Story of Property Acquisition in Sexual Harassment Cases into a Feminist Castle Doctrine, 6 VA. J.
SOCIAL POL'Y & L. 197, 313 (1999) (remarking on the "unacknowledged social and legal realities"
of the slave world). See also JAMES W. CLARKE, THE LINEAMENTS OF WRATH: RACE, VIOLENT
CRmIE, AND AMERICAN CULTURE 148 (1998) (noting assumption that "black women welcomed
sexual aggression"); DARYL MICHAEL ScoTT, SOCIAL POLICY AND THE IMAGE OF THE DAMAGED
BLACK PSYCHE, 1880-1996 at 47 (1997) (commenting on claim of "freer sexual mores of rural
blacks") (footnote omitted).
277. See LAWRENCE KRAMER, AFTER THE LOVEDEATH: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND THE
MAKING OF CULTURE 8 (1997) ("Built into the very structure of identity, sexual violence is always
already sublimated into the inner or outer threat by which it (re)establishes itself as legitimate.");
see also ARTHUR BRITTAN, MASCULINITY AND POWER 19-45 (1989) (theorizing models of mascu-
line gender identity); Jo Goodey, Understanding Racism and Masculinity: Drawing on Research
with Boys Aged Eight to Sixteen, 26 INT'L J. SOC. L. 393, 414-15 (1998) (citing intersection of
masculinity and racism).
278. See VICTOR J. SEIDLER, RECREATING SEXUAL POLITICS: MEN, FEMINISM AND POLITICS
141-42 (1991) (approving the location of "male violence at the centre of an understanding of social
relations").
279. See SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 19-28.
280. See KENNETH POLK, WHEN MEN KILL: SCENARIOS OF MASCULINE VIOLENCE 27-57
(1994) (describing masculine lethal violence associated with sexual intimacy).
281. LAWRENCE KRAMER, AFTER THE LOVEDEATH: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND THE MAKING
OF CULTURE 6 (1997).
282. Id. ("Racial, sexual, and social polarities cut across gender polarity in complex ways and
further deplete the position of [masculine] entitlement.").
283. See FRED PFEIL, WHITE GUYS: STUDIES IN POSTMODERN DOMINATION AND DIF-
FERENCE 260 (1995) (explicating 'new' forms of white straight masculinity").
284. For a helpful treatment of these two categories, see Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated
Violence: Developing a Meaningful Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 123, 142-57 (1999) (proposing gender-motivation standard of assessment to guide courts in
determining when acts of gender-biased violence warrant federal civil rights intervention).
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violence of the Central Park Jogger case obscures these two categories under
the veil of race. It also poses complications for the showing of gender ani-
mus required for prosecution under the 1994 federal Violence Against
Women Act.285 This Act is often heralded as one of the best new prosecuto-
rial developments in combating sexualized violence. Injecting race into the
statutory equation, however, may make it more difficult for prosecutors to
establish gender animus. Although Julie Goldscheid contends that Con-
gress's "inclusion of the term 'animus' does not change the nature or quan-
tum of evidence required to establish gender-motivation,"286 she concedes
that relevant "legislative history indicates that allegations of domestic vio-
lence, rape, or sexual assault may not presumably be considered to be gen-
der-motivated for the purpose of federal civil rights intervention."287 Lack-
ing this presumption, more evidence of a discriminatory purpose may be re-
quired. Yet, once race is added to the context, identifying a gender-related
discriminatory purpose may prove even more onerous. Prosecuting racial-
ized sexual violence under hate crimes statutes, 288 rather than the Violence
Against Women Act, poses related obstacles of categorical race/gender am-
biguity. Despite these difficulties, such statutes give prosecutors the oppor-
tunity to heighten public awareness of racialized sexual violence against
women as part of a community-based movement to reconstruct interracial
community.
B. Lawyers and Community: Lessons in Grassroots Community Power
The collaboration of lawyers and community is well documented in the
modem law reform movements championing civil rights, welfare rights,
women's rights, and gay/lesbian rights. The starting point for an analysis of
Kristian Miccio refers to this latter category under the term "intimate" violence or "violence
against women by intimate partners." G. Kristian Miccio, A Reasonable Battered Mother? Rede-
fining, Reconstructing, and Recreating the Battered Mother in Child Protective Proceedings, 22
HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 89 n.1 (1999) (deconstructing legal and cultural standard of the battered
mother). To Miceio, the act of intimate violence "is contextual and denotes physical or psychologi-
cal acts committed by one against another with whom he or she has a relationship." Id. at 89 n.l.
285. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994).
286. Goldscheid, supra note 284, at 150. Goldscheid points out that "Congress used the term
'animus' to mean 'purpose', as in 'an animating force,' and it used the words 'animus,' 'purpose,'
and 'motivation' interchangeably, dispelling any notion that disparate impact, i.e., proof that a vio-
lent act disproportionately affects women, alone would be sufficient to merit recovery." Id. at 150
(footnote omitted).
287. Id. at 152 (footnote omitted).
288. See Marguerite Angelari, Hate Crime Statutes: A Promising Tool for Fighting Violence
Against Women, in PORNOGRAPHY, SEX WORK, AND HATE SPEECH 405, 442-46 (Karen J.
Maschke ed., 1997) (underlining importance of exploding myths of violence against women and of
new legal remedies for female victims of violence).
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this collaboration is the notion of community itself.289 The meaning of
community may turn on the identity of the lawyer, client, or group. Because
groups become actualized through social institutions and relations,290 group
identity is especially complex. Consequently, appeals to the common
good291 of the whole may be stymied. In this way, the politics of identity292
provokes great uncertainty about the continued efficacy of law-
yer/community collaboration in promoting court-induced political and socio-
economic change. Nevertheless, prior movements remain instructive.
1. The civil rights movement.
The civil rights movement provides an illuminating example of interra-
cial collaboration. For prosecutors, the civil rights movement teaches les-
sons of racial identity, narrative, and community. To be sure, the history of
civil rights advocacy leaves an ambiguous legacy of interracial community293
and electoral politics.294 Indeed, the history of black community mobiliza-
tion is matched by countervailing white community resistance.295 Even
when unchallenged by white resistance, mobilization sometimes threatened
community solidarity296 and inspired distorted depictions of black culture.297
Moreover, because of its confinement to the realm of local political and eco-
nomic disobedience, rather than to regional or national economic market
289. See Stephen L. Pepper, Autonomy, Community, and Lawyers'Ethics, 19 CAP. U. L. REV.
939, 957-61 (1990) (debating the meaning of community in legal representation).
290. See Catherine Connolly, Not Always in Knots, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 247, 248 (1999)
(reviewing MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW (1997)
and noting that "social institutions work to make [group identities] real; so do long histories of
enslavement, subordination, or other sustained maltreatment").
291. See id. ("It does little good to tell people to halt preoccupation with group identity and
past pain and to defer to the common good.").
292. See id. at 248 (commenting that "[i]dentity politics help some people feel connected and
empowered: for example, organizing against shared oppression builds a sense of belonging among
members of social movements, and 'coming out' aids young gay men and lesbians to find accep-
tance in a new community").
293. See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: How A DEDICATED
BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REvOLUTION (1994).
294. See Terry Smith, Reinventing Black Politics: Senate Districts, Minority Vote Dilution
and the Preservation of the Second Reconstruction, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 277, 286-308 (1998)
(tracing the history of the Seventeenth Amendment).
295. See GREENBERG, supra note 293, at 212-22, 225-43, 267-84 (chronicling local and re-
gional backlash against civil rights encroachment on structures of southern segregation).
296. For example, consider the use of the "race card" in jury selection. See Albert W. Al-
schuler, How to Win the Trial of the Century: The Ethics of Lord Brougham and the O.J. Simpson
Defense Team, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 291, 311-17 (1998) (discussing the doctrinal and practical
demands of color-blindness in the prosecutorial and defensive use of the "race card" during jury
selection).
297. For an insightful discussion of harmful depictions of black culture, see Cedric J. Robin-
son, Blaxploitation and the Misrepresentation of Liberation, 40 RACE & CLASS 1, 11 (1998).
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protests, mobilization often failed to facilitate and to restructure commercial
exchange relationships.298 Where it succeeded it demonstrated that "insur-
gents can, with the necessary mobilization and the proper combination of
strategies, influence significant change,"299 albeit on a small-scale.300
Among these strategies, community education and organization hold crucial
import for marshalling the defense of indigenous communities.301
2. Welfare rights movement.
The welfare rights movement also provides instructive lessons about the
role of community education and mobilization.302 The modem history of the
welfare rights advocacy movement303 may be traced through the early relief
movement,304 the subsequent emergence of the National Welfare Rights Or-
ganization,305 and finally to the Poor People's Campaign of 1968.306 To-
gether these campaigns engaged in and responded to the racial construction
of identity and community.307 Weighing heavily on the meaning of moral
character,30S that construction continues to dominate current debates over
298. See Dmitri Mehlhorn, A Requiem for Blockbusting: Law, Economics, and Race-Based
Real Estate Speculation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145, 1191 (1998) (speculating on civil rights advo-
cacy aimed at facilitating contracts between resident whites and home-seeking blacks).
299. JAMES W. BUTTON, BLACKS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: IMPACT OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN SOUTHERN COMuNrrMEs 238 (1989).
300. One such small-scale change is community-based law enforcement partnerships. See
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE DRUG CRISIS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LAWYERS AS
VOLUNTEERS: ADDRESSING SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND VIOLENCE IN COMMUNITIES-A PROGRAM
GUIDE 33-39 (June 1995).
301. See Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous
Communities, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 557, 571-90 (1999) (explicating theories of community lawyer-
ing and representation).
302. For an example of prosecutor-initiated community mobilization, see Robert E. Cramer,
Jr., The District Attorney as a Mobilizer in a Community Approach to Child Sexual Abuse, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 209 (1985).
303. For useful accounts of the welfare rights movement, see LARRY R. JACKSON & WILLIAM
A. JOHNSON, PROTEST BY THE POOR: THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK CITY 13-
51 (1973); FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY
THEY SUCCEED, HOw THEY FAIL 264-361 (1977).
304. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 303, at 266-88 (tracing genesis of the poor relief
movement).
305. See id. at 288-353 (charting the rise and fall of the National Welfare Rights Organization).
306. See GREENBERG, supra note 293, at 430-39 (documenting intersection of civil and eco-
nomic rights organizing in poor people's movement).
307. On the expansion of the welfare rights movement into the racialized landscape of the
southern states, see MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960-1973,56-69 (1993).
308. See JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF
POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA 9-11 (1991) (distinguishing normative rhetoric sepa-
rating "deserving" and "undeserving poor").
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race, welfare, and reproduction.309 For example, strains of that debate have
hampered the homeless fights movement31o and curbed the expansion of le-
gal services for impoverished immigrants.311 Few vestiges of that character
debate surround the low income community development movement.
312
Community economic development advocates recognize the links between
the black urban experience and the economy, public policy and racism.
Their agenda, which includes banking,313 child care and "activist mother-
ing,"314 housing,315 and even resident-controlled redevelopment,316 is already
supplying significant benefits to low-income communities of color.317
3. Women's rights movement.
The women's rights movement offers similar lessons of grassroots com-
munity power and leadership, through strategies of resistance, in spite of its
309. See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 202-08 (1997) (discussing the racist origins of the welfare system).
310. See MARK LTWAK, COURTROOM CRUSADERS 11-40 (1989) (describing homeless advo-
cacy in Los Angeles).
311. See Robert L. Bach, Building Community Among Diversity: Legal Services for Impover-
ished Immigrants, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 639, 657 (1994) ("An effort to assure effective legal serv-
ices for impoverished immigrants should recognize their shared problems with established resi-
dents, the range of resources and groups currently involved in providing help, and the potential for
building a broad-based community revitalization reform movement.").
312. See Symposium, Revitalizing America's Cities, 27 MICH. J.L. REF. 613-875 (1994).
313. See Rochelle E. Lento, Community Development Banking Strategy for Revitalizing Our
Communities, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 773, 778-803 (1994) (outlining structure of community devel-
opment banks and credit unions); see generally Richard Marsico, A Guide to Enforcing the Com-
munity Reinvestment Act, 20 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 165 (1993) (exploring the enforcement challenges
of the Community Reinvestment Act); Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Eco-
nomic Empowerment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Ra-
cial Justice, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1465 (1994) (examining the effect of globally and nationally con-
trolled banking institutions on economic injustice).
314. See NANCY A. NAPLES, GRASSROOTS WARRIORS: ACTIVIST MOTHERING, COMMUNITY
WORK, AND THE WAR ON POVERTY 109-30 (1998) (defining "activist mothering" in terms of both
traditional kinship group mothering and nurturing, community-based practices of political and so-
cial activism); Peter Pitegoff, Child Care Enterprise, Community Development, and Work, 81 GEO.
L.J. 1897 (1993) (claiming that child care "can be a vehicle for community-based economic devel-
opment").
315. See Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing the Central City with
Resident Control, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 689, 752-68 (1994) (hereinafter Redevelopment Redefined)
(surveying strategies, criticisms, burdens, and incentives of resident-controlled redevelopment); see
also Benjamin B. Quinones, Serving the Client in New Ways: Community Economic Development,
CED on the Job, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 773, 773 (1993).
316. See Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined, supra note 315, at 752-68.
317. See generally Henry L. Taylor, Jr., Social Transformation Theory, African Americans
and the Rise of Buffalo's Post-Industrial City, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 569 (1991) (discussing the link
between the black urban experience and the economy, pubic policy, and racism).
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frequent neglect of the experience of women of color.318 The women's rights
movement teaches prosecutorial sensitivity to gender power and leader-
ship,319 stressing the collaborative significance of gender awareness and gov-
ernance.320 This lesson survives quarrels over the nature of women's situated
knowledge and community.321 In addition, it provides guidance for other
movements seeking to overcome the contradictory identities and social loca-
tions322 found at the intersection of gender, race, and class.323
4. The gay/lesbian rights movement.
The gay/lesbian rights movement, by comparison, demonstrates the
prosecutorial insight gained from strategies of degendering and recompos-
ing.324 Additionally it underscores the values of honor and community to
self and group identity.325  Admittedly, historic rights-based anti-
discrimination strategies326 struggle in addressing "transsexual or overt
318. For examples of resistance and rights advocacy by women of color, see Allison M. Dus-
sias, Squaw Drudges, Farm Wives, and the Dann Sisters' Last Stand: American Indian Women's
Resistance to Domestication and the Denial of Their Property Rights, 77 N.C. L. REV. 637, 707-26
(1999) (describing Native American sisters' struggle since the late 1970s to protect their ranch); see
Virginia P. Coto, LUCHA, The Struggle for Life: Legal Services for Battered Immigrant Women, 53
U. MIA L. REv. 749, 755-58 (1999) (describing representation of battered immigrant women
through education, legal services, and organizing); Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act
and the Construction of Multiple Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 4 J. L.
& POL'Y 463, 477-81 (1996) (pointing to anti-violence strategies overlapping communities of color
and women).
319. See Rita Mae Kelly & Georgia Duerst-Lahti, The Study of Gender Power and Its Link to
Governance and Leadership, in GENDER POWER, LEADERSHIP, AND GOVERNANCE 39, 39-64
(Georgia Duerst-Lahti & Rita Mae Kelly eds., 1995) (linking gender to power in public leadership).
320. See Rita Mae Kelly & Georgia Duerst-Lahti, Toward Gender Awareness and Gender
Balance in Leadership and Governance, in GENDER POwER, LEADERSHIP, AND GOVERNANCE 259,
259-71 (Georgia Duerst-Lahti & Rita Mae Kelly eds., 1995) (elaborating on gender as a set of
practices imbued with symbolic meaning).
321. See ROSI BRAIDoTT, PATTERNS OF DISSONANCE: A STUDY OF WOMEN IN CON-
TEMPORARY PHILOsOPHY 271-72 (1991) (noting that "[slituated knowledges make possible a vi-
sion of reality as a web of interconnected points, openings and moments of mutual receptivity that
spin the web of social connectedness, communication and community").
322. See Sandra Harding, Reinventing Ourselves as Other: More New Agents of History and
Knowledge, in AMERICAN FEMINIST THOUGHT AT CENTuRY'S END: A READER 140, 145-53 (Linda
S. Kaufnan ed., 1993) (describing "outsider within" social locations and identities).
323. Joan Williams notes that the category of gender often verges into race and class. Joan
Williams, Implementing Antiessentialism: How Gender Wars Turn into Race and Class Conflict, 15
HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 41, 47-71 (1999).
324. See R.W. CONNELL, MASCULINITES 232-34 (1995) (defining degendering strategy as an
attempt to dismantle "hegemonic masculinity").
325. See Leonard Harris, Honor, Emasculation and Empowerment, in RETHINKING MASCU-
LINITY: PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS IN LIGHT OF FEMINSM 275, 284 (Larry May, Robert
Strikwerda & Patricia D. Hopkins eds., 2d. ed. 1996) (citing honor as a function of community).
326. For a historical review of rights-based gay and lesbian civil rights strategies, see DIANE
HELENE MILLER, FREEDOM TO DIFFER: THE SHAPING OF THE GAY AND LESBiAN STRUGGLE FOR
CWIL RIGHTS 139-60 (1998).
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transgender self-definition"327 and the transgressive use of female roles.328
This struggle, further burdened by the onus of class,329 accentuates the im-
portance of contemplating postmodern prosecutorial norms and narratives.
C. Postmodern Prosecutorial Norms and Narratives
Postmodern schools of thought extend to law330 and lawyers.331 Juris-
prudentially, they offer a foundational critique of the possibility of objective
knowledge and neutral judgment in the law. That critique sets postmodern-
ism apart from liberalism in two fundamental ways. The first distinction
goes to interpretation. Postmodernists claim that lawyers and judges are
"always and already interpreting."332 Interpretation, in turn, is "shaped by
one's horizon of sociocultural prejudices and interests."333 The second dis-
tinction relates to norms. Postmodernists excoriate the prescriptive thrust of
liberal norms as implausible and unprincipled.334
In the realm of criminal prosecution, postmodern norms and narratives
jar the antebellum and postbellum habits of prosecutorial discretion. Those
327. Kathleen Chapman & Michael Du Plessis, "Don't Call Me Girl". Lesbian Theory,
Feminist Theory, and Transsexual Identities, in CROSS-PURPOSES: LESBIANS, FEMINISTS, AND THE
LIMITS OF ALLIANCE 169, 173 (Dana Heller ed., 1997) (mentioning that the transgressivley gen-
dered seek self-definition and redefinition outside of a bi-polar identity-making system of gender
and sexuality).
328. See Laura Harris & Liz Crocker, Bad Girls: Sex, Class, and Feminist Agency, in FEmm:
FEMINISTS, LESBIANS, AND BAD GIRLS 93, 101 (Laura Harris & Elizabeth Crocker, eds., 1997)
(discussing desire and self-imaging in female role categories). The transgressive use of the female
role, for example, in the image of the prostitute as "femme bad girl" provides "a strong expression
of a feminist consciousness" but seems inapt to traditional rights-based anti-discrimination strate-
gies. Id. at 101.
329. See RUTHANN ROBSON, SAPPHO GOES TO LAW SCHOOL: FRAGMENTS IN LESBIAN
LEGAL THEORY 205-13 (1998). Robson observes:
[I]t is not simply that lower class or poor is a rhetorical category or identity that allows pros-
perity to be normalized and other economic conditions to be pathologized, creating a group of
others who are deviant. The same process of categorization occurs in racial, ethnic, religious,
and sexualized identities and may serve liberatory as well as repressive interests.
Id. at 207 (footnote omitted).
330. See generally GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURIS-
PRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END (1995) (exploring modem and postmodern movements in legal
scholarship).
331. See Stephen M. Feldman, Playing with the Pieces: Postmodernism in the Lawyer's Tool-
box, 85 VA. L. REv. 151, 152 (1999) (finding that enmeshed structures of scholarly and lawyerly
discourse compel postmodernists to construct narratives and arguments using available modernist
rhetorical tools and modes of discourse); see also Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of
Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 803-04 (1991) (mentioning trial lawyer manipulation of doctrine in
postmodenist denunciation of the law's normative foundations).
332. Feldman, supra note 331 at 155-56 n.13.
333. Id.
334. See generally Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167
(1990) (attacking the inconsistencies and weaknesses of normative legal thought).
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accrued myth-making habits of construing stable forms of racial identity and
status are incompatible with the emerging postmodern jurisprudence of race
in American law, particularly the notions of mutable racial identity and
community.
1. Postmodernism and race.
The intersection of postmodernism and race is best illustrated in trials of
racial identity. In fact, the postmodem break from prosecutorial tradition
occurs, not in the repudiation of normative policy prescription, but in the
clasp of racial identity. For prosecutors, postmodern racial identity is race-
conscious. Conceived as an element of personhood, identity resists juridical
translation and commodity fetishism. Indeed, it lacks a clear-cut juridical or
commodity form transferable to a courtroom or a market economy.335 This
lack of structure, combined with the properties of thickness and mutability,
precludes the complete translation and full commodification of identity.
Nevertheless, prosecutors in race trials engage in a crude process of transla-
tion that produces raw images of racial identity, here in the figures of ma-
rauding black teenagers and sadistic white supremacists.
2. Postmodernism and gender.
Connecting identity to race occasions multiple alliances with the categories
of gender, ethnicity, and sexuality.336 However, the contingency of the lawyer's
identity3 37 and the intervention of the prosecutorial state raise the danger of dis-
rupting those alliances either by distorting identity or by creating an ill-fitting
new form of "public identity."338 Even without such disruptions, state-imposed
classifications of public and private identity still may not survive a courtroom's
335. For a discussion of inalienability under property regimes, see Jeanne L. Schroeder,
Three's a Crowd: A Feminist Critique of Calabresi and Melamed's One View of the Cathedral, 84
CORNELL L. REv. 394, 417-18 (1999); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1849 (1987) (analyzing market-inalienability and presenting a justification
rooted in human flourishing).
336. Compare Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581, 604 (1990) with Jane Wong, The Anti-Essentialism v. Essentialism Debate in Feminist
Legal Theory: The Debate and Beyond, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 289 (1999) (assailing
Harris for suggesting that "only women of color possess a multiplicitous self and that a dividing
line can be drawn between white and non-white women in terms of their race").
337. See Wilkins, supra note I 11, at 1033 (discussing the professional and legal implications
of a lawyer's "race-based personal commitments and group-based affiliations").
338. Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Legal Articulation of Sexual Orientation
Identity, in AFTER IDENTrTY: A READER IN LAW AND CULTURE 24, 34 (Dan Danielsen & Karen
Engle, eds. 1995) (noting that, "even as the court monopolizes the power to define and control the
subjective experience of stigma, it simultaneously establishes the legal fiction that those harmed by
government discrimination have chosen their injury") (footnote omitted).
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"rational basis scrutiny."339 As a result, prosecutorial attempts at state interven-
tion through postmodern identity may accomplish little beyond domesticating a
postmodern concept for the purpose of bolstering a modernist normative claim
of community. Both civil rights and poverty lawyers implicitly acknowledge the
dense postmodem quality of client identity only to domesticate it in order to ad-
vance constitutional or statutory entitlement claims and to promote some sem-
blance of commonality.340 In the Byrd case, prosecutors conceded evidence of
the complexity of the defendants' white identity, yet fastened that identity to the
foundational base of racism. 341
3. Racial identity in law and politics.
The notion of racial identity and the accompanying principle of race-
consciousness remain controversial in law and politics. In law, race-
conscious practices embroil fields of education, employment, and housing.
In politics, race-conscious policies entangle government subsidies and elec-
toral voting.342 Accordingly, pragmatic reorientation of the prosecution
function requires that race-conscious practices defer in part to the colorblind
spirit of American constitutionalism and jurisprudence. That colorblind
spirit of identity lies underdeveloped in the model of postbellum discretion.
Untapped by the sterile postbellum regime of limited political and economic
rights, the rhetoric of colorblindness at times may furnish the crucial political
joinder of identity to community.343
For prosecutors, postmodern racial community relocates the reality of the
self in the context of community, creating an embodied agent for the self.
339. See generally Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court
from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REv. 357 (1999) (explicating underlying
principles of Supreme Court rational basis jurisprudence).
340. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769
(1992).
341. At the sentencing phase of the trial of Lawrence Russell Brewer, prosecutor Patrick
Hardy commented: "It's tough on anybody that did the best they could to raise their children if a
child turns out to be a Lawrence Russell Brewer." Bruce Tomaso, Parents of Jasper Killer Plead
for Son's Life: Jury to Decide Whether Brewer Will Be Executed, DALLAS MORNING NEWs, Sept.
22, 1999, at A31. Brewer's father blamed his son's racist attitudes on the Texas prison system. See
Michael Graczyk, Parents of Convicted Killer Plead with Jurors, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 21,
1999 ("My son is not what the press has made of him."). Newspaper editorials also pointed to "in-
dividual pathologies, perhaps shaped by the harsh environment of Texas penitentiaries.. . ." Edito-
rial, Jasper Slaying Stands Apart for Its Cruelty, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, June 11, 1998, at A32.
342. See, e.g., J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS
AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 270 (1999) ("Redistricting cannot be race-
unconscious until the country ceases to be, and pretending that society or politics has become col-
orblind can only allow discrimination to go unchecked.").
343. Catherine Connolly points to identity politics as "a method that acknowledges both the
atrocity committed upon one individual as well as the impact the event has on a whole community."
Connolly, supra note 290, at 251. Indeed, for Connolly, identity politics presents "a way of con-
ceptualizing shared reality." Id.
Apr. 2000] RECONSTRUCTING COMMUNIIY
Self-embodiment of this kind incorporates collective discourse and action
into subjective identity.344 When the horizon of community prejudice pre-
cludes colorblind understanding, communication, and perception, and instead
tolerates acts of hate based on race, the prosecution function may spurn
regulation in favor of freedom of expression. Given its foundational ties to
liberal legalism, the hate speech remedy345 of postmodem censorship the-
ory346 may be unacceptable. But tolerance may be equally unacceptable.
4. Liberal legalism, tolerance, and postmodern censorship of racist
speech.
At first glance, tolerance harbors the potential to "make possible both a
politics of reason and a conception of political community that dignifies the
capacity for reasonableness of all persons to be self-governing moral
agents."3 47 Yet, it provides no guidance in resolving the divergence of racial
interests within communities.34s Tactics of accommodating difference,349
manifested, for example, in the appeal to common sense and intuition, 350 are
344. See CALVIN 0. SCHRAG, THE SELF AFTER POSTMODERNITY 82 (1997) (observing that
historical agents must encounter each other "face-to-face in situations of agreement and dissent,
harmony and discord, liberation and oppression, mastery and slavery"); see also Feldman, supra
note 331 at 155 (remarking that "for the individual within the community, one's current horizon of
sociocultural prejudices and interests always shapes understanding, communication, and perception
in general, including normative values and goals").
345. See generally HENRY Louis GATES, JR., ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, DONALD E. LIVELY,
ROBERT C. PosT, WILLIAM B. RUBENsTEIN & NADINE STROSSEN, SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING
OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1994) (challenging the notion that
free speech and equal rights are antagonistic in the context of hate speech); MARl J. MATSUDA,
CHARLES R. LAWRENCE I, RICHARD DELGADO, & KIMBERLE WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, WORDs
THAT VOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1993) (setting out a foundational argument for hate speech codes); HATE SPEECH AND THE
CONSTITUTION (Steven J. Heyman, ed., 1996) (presenting both sides of the debate over hate
speech).
346. See generally, e.g., Stephen G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (1996).
347. David AJ. Richards, Contractualist Impartiality in the American Struggle for Justice: A
Comment on Professor Allen's "Social Contract Theory in American Case Law," 51 FLA. L. REV.
41,61 (1999).
348. See Stefan R. F. Khittel, The Law Concerning the Black Communities in Columbia: Eth-
nic Rights or Anti-Discrimination Rights?, in LAW & ANTHROPOLOGY 265, 279 (Ren6 Kuppe &
Richard Potz eds., 1999) (documenting interest divergence between indigenous groups and black
communities in Columbia).
349. See, e.g., Vrinda Narain, Women's Rights and the Accommodation of "Difference:"
Muslim Women in India, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 43, 66-71 (1998) (mentioning the
limitations of women's rights discourse in accommodating the religious-cultural differences of the
Muslim community in India).
350. See Richard E. Redding, How Common-Sense Psychology Can Inform Law and Psycho-
legal Research, 5 U. CH. L.S. ROUNDTABLE 107, 110 (1998) (defining common sense psychology
in terms of "the lay knowledge of human behavior").
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unlikely to prevail against the force of unconscious racism.351 An alternative
appeal to the social contract groundwork of law and community may produce
the same outcome. Although Anita Allen mentions that "social contract can
foster the spirit of cooperation and compromise,352 contractual bargaining
theory proves unhelpful because of the difficulty of making community-wide
bargains.353 This deficiency also condemns relational contract theory354 em-
ployed in commercial3S5 and marital contexts.356 Admittedly, a derivative
theory of relational, community-based contracts reliant on a regime of intra-
community promises between parties over goals and community welfare of-
fers some promise in mediating the divergent interests between community-
based racial identities. But the ineffectiveness of non-state enforcement
mechanisms and the involuntary nature of state enforcement systems are
troubling, even when extra-state enforcement through "a complex network of
social and relational norms" 357 appears feasible. Moreover, an extra-state
network fails to guarantee mutual community commitment and trust.35 8  It
also neglects to cure the problem of race-infected inequity in bargaining.359
A final tactic of accommodating difference through tolerance adverts to
racial empathy.360 Integrating tolerance and empathy requires cultivated
judgment361 and inculcated learning.362 It mixes responsivity and responsi-
351. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Ap-
proach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186-1217
(1995) (discussing the cognitive biases and ingrained stereotypes that underlie discriminatory
treatment); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Un-
conscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (locating the roots and causes of discrimina-
tion outside of conscious intent).
352. Allen, supra note 234, at 15.
353. See Stephen M. Nickelsburg, Mere Volunteers? The Promise and Limits of Community-
Based Environmental Protection, 84 VA. L. REV. 1371, 1382-96 (1998) (enumerating structural
factors that make community-wide bargains difficult).
354. See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67
VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981).
355. See generally Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial
Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990).
356. See generally Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84
VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998) (applying relational contractual theory to marriage).
357. Id. at 1229.
358. See Russell Hardin, Trustworthiness, 107 ETHICS 26, 42 (1996) (linking law and con-
vention to reliability and interest).
359. See Blake D. Morant, The Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Contract The-
ory: An Intriguing Comparison, 50 ALA. L. REV. 63, 108-09 (1998) (noting that application of
contextualism to contract analysis "permits exploration of the possible operation of stereotype and
prejudice within the bargaining context") (footnotes omitted).
360. Peter Margulies urges postmodem progressives "to bridge the gap between interpersonal
and political empathy" by embracing the conception of engagement. Engagement, Margulies cau-
tions, "requires the person experiencing empathy to take some risk." Peter Margulies, Re-Framing
Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, 5 CLINICAL L. REv. 605, 606 (1999).
361. See generally Thomas Morawetz, Empathy and Judgment, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 517
(1996).
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bility363 in the form of dialogue.364 The prosecution function may enhance
dialogue by reference to the concept that Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thomp-
son call "an economy of moral disagreement."365 Applied to a deliberative
process of community exchange over the merits of "morally respectable po-
sitions," Gutmann and Thomas urge participants "to minimize the range of
their disagreement by promoting policies on which their principles converge,
even if they would otherwise place those policies significantly lower on their
own list of political priorities."366
The Gutmann-Thompson approach to moral dialogue and community
tolerance, while attractive, gives no direction to the resolution of racial pol-
icy divergence. Lacking a principle of interracial policy convergence, the
approach slows in carving a path from community tolerance to assimilation
of policies and positions.367 The result may be discovered in black exit, not
only from community, but also from electoral politics.368 That result encour-
ages the creation of alternative institutions outside politics, for example as a
facet of inner-city economic development369 and community-based environ-
mental protection.370
362. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Power of Narrative in Empathetic Learning:
Post-Modernism and the Stories of Law, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S J. L. 287 (1992) (book review).
363. Calvin Schrag introduces the notions of responsivity and responsibility in elaborating
upon "[t]he profile of the self in community ... .' SCHRAG, supra note 344, at 91. He explains:
"Responsivity functions basically as a descriptive term; responsibility connotes, if not an explicitly
prescriptive content, in a significant measure an ethical stance, an ethos, a way of dwelling in a
social world that gives rise to human goals and purposes, obligations, duties, and concerns for hu-
man rights." Id.
364. See Nancy Levit, Critical of Race Theory: Race, Reason, Merit, and Civility, 87 GEO.
L.J. 795, 817 (1999) Oinking dialogue to a willingness both to listen and to tailor communication to
the listeners' perspective).
365. Thompson, supra note 201, at 115 (emphasis in original); see also AMy GuTrMANN &
DENNIS F. THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 346-61 (1996) (proposing a conception
of deliberative democracy constituted by both regulatory principles-reciprocity, publicity, and
accountability-and substantive principles-basic liberty, basic opportunity, and fair opportunity-
of moral reasoning).
366. Id. at 115-16.
367. Larry Backer comments that "The interplay between tolerance and assimilation can oc-
cur because of the interpretive potential of our core socio-cultural structural conduct norms."
Backer, supra note 25, at 194. Such rules, Backer maintains, "allow for a range of possibility
within which the group can identify." Id.
368. See Terry Smith, A Black Party? Timmons, Black Backlash and the Endangered Two-
Party Paradigm, 48 DuKE L.J. 1, 51-66 (1998) (contemplating constitutional overtones of black
exodus from American two-party system).
369. See generally Michael H. Schill, Assessing the Role of Community Development Corpo-
rations in Inner City Economic Development, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 753 (1996-97)
(describing the rise of community development corporations (CDCs) and their efforts to improve
the state of inner city neighborhoods).
370. See Nickelsburg, supra note 353, at 1409 (contending that vagaries of local choice and
arbitrariness of local jurisdictional boundaries produce patchwork community-wide environmental
solutions).
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5. The merits of collective action.
Conceding the ultimate "limits of unilateral community-based self-help
measures"371 at block372 and neighborhood levels fails to defeat the logic of
collective action.373 In the context of prosecution, that logic suggests that
prosecutors take on the role of community organizer.374 This state-initiated
role puts aside the often-heard objections of elitism375 and paternalism in or-
der to explore a range of prosecutorial community-building strategies. It is
inaccurate to call this strategic initiative non-adversarial in the traditional
sense. Taken from experimental community-enhancing strategies of media-
tion,376 community building through prosecution may in fact prove adver-
sarial. Its main focus, however, is on the enabling process of community
reconstruction.
Community-enabling strategies 377 afford a role for community but "it is a
role that respects the autonomy and informed judgments of the parties."378
371. MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 193 (1995).
372. See Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE LJ. 75, 78-
85 (1998) (discussing advantages of block-level institutions).
373. See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982) (introducing a dynamic
model of collective action to explain large group cooperation over time); MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (explicating dynamics of collective action among small and
mass groups).
374. Cf Brian Glick & Matthew H. Rossman, Neighborhood Legal Services as House Coun-
sel to Community-Based Efforts to Achieve Economic Justice: The East Brooklyn Experience, 23
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 105 (1997) (recounting the experience of the Brooklyn Legal Aid
Services Corporation in operating as house counsel to low income communities).
375. See John C. Koritansky, Temperance, Passions, and Lawyers in the American Demo-
cratic Regime, in ETHICS AND CHARACTER: THE PURSUIT OF DEMOCRATIC VIRTUES 141, 155-56
(William D. Richardson, J. Michael Martinez & Kerry R. Stewart eds., 1998) (observing that "law-
yers exemplify an indirect, partial, but still invaluable exception to the more general pronouncement
that there can be no aristocratic element in democratic society that opposes democracy's natural
propensities").
376. See Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex "Marriage" Through Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Community-Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1687, 1749-60 (1997) (espousing a community-enhancing vision of dispute resolution). Freshman
contends:
[D]ispute resolution should enhance the salience of a particular community in either, or both,
of two ways: (1) individuals should resolve disputes according to the community (including
some combination of its norms, history, and practices); and (2) individuals should leave the
process more firmly incorporating that community in their sense of who they are.
Id. at 1749.
377. See id. at 1762 ("A community-enabling mediation would encourage parties to consider
the range of possible values and practices that could affect how they resolve a dispute or structure
an agreement.") (footnote omitted).
378. Id. at 1761.
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Wendy Brown Scott's notion of "transformative desegregation"379 may prove
useful in this respect. Scott advocates boundary-crossing to learn about other
cultural identities and experiences.380 Boundary crossing, Scott intimates,
demands the sharing of power.381 It is unclear whether this obligatory shar-
ing may be more fairly analogized to "social duties voluntarily undertaken"
by citizens or "civic obligations imposed by the state."382 Voluntarism seems
more consistent with autonomy and consensual community. Yet, because of
tensions associated with racial identity, state-induced civic obligations may
be warranted. No necessary diminution of autonomy or weakening of com-
munity seems implied from state intervention, though it is unlikely that a
prosecutor/organizer may plausibly represent a collective or community en-
tity under the aegis of the state. Such dual forms of representation already
create ethical strains in the public and private law fields of family,383 un-
ion,384 and group advocay385 where members frequently fall unheard. Com-
parable criticisms of an intermediary role for lawyers may be fatal to the in-
stant proposal.386
379. Wendy Brown Scott, Transformative Desegregation: Liberating Hearts and Minds, 2 J.
GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 315, 319 (1999).
380. Id. at 318 ("The current desegregation-integration process-oriented paradigm overlooks
the potential of non-hierarchical cultural interaction in an educational setting to reshape fundamen-
tal attitudes and beliefs about race and identity.") (footnote omitted).
381. Id. at 357-60.
382. LINDA K. KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLI-
GATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 305 (1998) (distinguishing between voluntary social duties and state-
imposed obligations in the sphere of domestic relations and the family).
383. See Russell G. Pearce, Foreword: Reexamining the Family Values of Legal Ethics, 22
SEATrLE U. L. REv. 1, 2-4 (1998) (promoting ethics rule accommodation to allow representation of
families as entities); see also Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Ap-
proaches to Conflicts in Representing Spouses, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1253, 1258 (1994) (advocat-
ing that families be able to elect a form of representation that treats the family as a unit despite
conflicts of interest between individuals); Naomi Cahn & Robert Tuttle, Dependency and Delega-
tion: The Ethics of Marital Representation, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 97, 121-37 (1998) (approving
concurrent representation of husband and wife, including spousal delegation of authority).
384. See generally Russell G. Pearce, The Union Lawyer's Obligations to Bargaining Unit
Members: A Case Study of the Interdependence of Legal Ethics and Substantive Law, 37 S. TEx. L.
REV. 1095 (1996) (discussing the conflicting obligations owed by a lawyer to a union client and to
the individual members of the bargaining unit).
385. See Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collec-
tive Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103,
1105-06 (1992) (noting that group representation is a significant facet of a public interest lawyer's
work).
386. See generally John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of
Multiple Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741; Alysa Christmans
Rollock, Professional Responsibility and Organization of the Family Business: The Lawyer as In-
termediary, 73 ND. L.J. 567 (1998) (pointing to practical and ethical considerations hindering law-




Infirmities notwithstanding, the proposed embrace of a prosecutorial
ethic of race-conscious community outreach in cases of racially motivated
violence seems appropriate. The ethic garners justification on several
grounds. Normatively, the notion of reconstructive community seems im-
plicit in the punitive value of redemptive mercy. Functionally, community
looks embedded in the role-discretion and regulatory standards guiding the
prosecution function. Historically, community appears linked to lawyer-
engineered reform movements. Jurisprudentially, community occurs central
to emerging theories of race and identity.
Nonetheless, the groundwork upholding a prosecutorial ethic of race-
conscious community outreach cannot pretend to guarantee against subsi-
dence. The punitive value of retribution offers strong normative competi-
tion. Moreover, the traditions of statutory-bounded discretion and narrow
regulation inhibit an enlarged sense of community function. Furthermore,
the history of lawyer-dominated law reform movements suggests habits of
advocacy antithetical to community. Last, postmodern theories of race and
identity confound interpretive and practical efforts to construct community.
And yet, the rise of interracial violence compels the laying of such ground-
work both prescriptively, as a symbol of reconciliation, and descriptively, as
a critique of law in action.
Theorizing about the relationship between prosecutorial norms and their
impact on community entails both an implied critique and an express critique
of the current prosecution function in the field of racially-motivated violence.
The critique intends to fashion an alternative way of viewing prosecutorial
roles. Plainly, some roles of the prosecutor seem more advantageous than oth-
ers in the context of community violence. The task is to discover which roles
are more suitable. Because roles carry attendant discourses, the next task is to
connect the relationship between prosecutorial discourse (narratives) and the
prosecution of violence. More broadly, the task is to fit an adversarial criminal
justice system into a paradigm that can play a positive role in rebuilding com-
munity after major public incidents of violence.
Of course, theorizing without more will prove insufficient. Hence, the
essay strives for the convergence of theory and practice in the development of
different theoretical models of prosecutorial roles and narratives that already
emerge from the law as seen in the trials of the Central Park Jogger and James
Byrd. At different points, the trials signal a potentially positive relationship
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between lawyers and community under prosecutorial policies of activism, out-
reach, and education.3
87
The groundwork for these policies is already in place. Close reading of
the two trials show that the very idea of community is embedded in the
norms and narratives of the criminal justice system whether grounded in con-
stitutional, statutory, or common law foundations. Admittedly, this showing
is not without objection. The notion of community is frustratingly vague.
Moreover, the norms and narratives and cases cited for purposes of illustra-
tion are unrepresentative, the former distorted by criminal justice system val-
ues, the latter deformed by under-inclusive sampling and high-profile stature.
Resorting to an empirical posture limited to the description of the role,
function, and regulation of prosecutors acting under state and federal crimi-
nal justice systems seems unresponsive to these objections. Even though the
description sifts from prosecutorial ethics rules and standards to demonstrate
that prevailing norms and narratives construct multiple prosecutorial roles
with accompanying burdens of freedom and constraint, further objections
mount. The objections do not quarrel with the proposition that such norms
and narratives construct multiple prosecutorial roles in the guise of constitu-
tional, institutional, professional, cultural, community, and moral agency.
Neither do they contravene the claims that the same norms and narratives
burden prosecutorial roles with considerations of procedural fairness, organ-
izational efficiency, and substantive justice. Instead, the objections complain
that the instant analysis misdescribes the role, function, and regulation of
prosecutors in state and federal criminal justice systems. Similarly, they
protest that the same analysis misderives prosecutorial norms and narratives
from governing ethics rules and standards. It follows that this erroneous de-
duction misstates norms and narratives, and overstates their impact on law,
culture, and society. The overstatement of the breadth and diversity of
prosecutorial roles results in overestimating the available freedom to maneu-
ver and in underestimating the constraints on the freedom of strategic move-
ment, including misreading the influence of contextual considerations.
The effort to explore methods of reconceiving the prosecutorial norms
and narratives applied in cases of racial violence in the hope of reconstruct-
ing interracial community seems vain in light of these additional objections.
Likewise, the related attempts to evaluate the cultural and societal impact of
such norms and narratives in combating the varied forms, contexts, and cate-
gories of racial violence illustrated in the Central Park Jogger and James
387. See Joni Hersch, Teen Smoking Behavior and the Regulatory Environment, 47 DUKE L.J.
1143, 1158-62 (1998) (recommending the use of education to combat youth smoking).
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Byrd trials, and to assess the potentially fruitful relationship of lawyers to
community based on contemporary law reform movements seem futile, par-
ticularly given the civil justice predicate for the civil rights, welfare rights,
women's rights, and gay/lesbian rights movements.
To establish the compatibility of prosecutorial norms and narratives with
the emerging jurisprudence of race in American law, especially the notions
of postmodern racial identity and community, seems a barren exercise if the
task of reconceiving prosecutorial norms and narratives amounts to folly.
Denying the fallacy of reimagination may provide little comfort, for that de-
nial summons the next objection condemning the utopian hope of recon-
structing interracial community. In this respect, it is not only the vagueness
of meaning surrounding the concept of interracial community, but also the
implausibility of assessing the cultural and societal impact of prosecutorial
norms and narratives that seem daunting.
Equally vexing, the forms of violence under scrutiny seem too wide-
ranging, the contexts and spatial geography of violence too dissimilar, and
the categories of violence too artificial. Add to this criticism the claimed
misplaced relationship of lawyers to community in a civil setting, the argua-
bly inappropriate analogy to and generalization from contemporary law re-
form movements, and the alleged incompatibility of prosecutorial norms and
narratives with the emerging jurisprudence of race in American law. Even if
the thesis proffered here survived this criticism, it may succumb to the con-
tention of incoherence attached to the postmodern notions of racial identity
and community.
Doubtless, to a great extent this essay and its proposals amount to a kind
of prosecutorial heresy. Activist lawyers out of our professional past, how-
ever, well understand the importance of heresy.388 Prosecutors grasp the
same in constructing innovative strategies to combat racial violence. The
strategy of prosecutorial intervention advanced here creates an opportunity
for state participation in reasoned public debate and political conflict389 over
interracial community and violence in contemporary America. Tragically,
388. Both clinical legal education and civil rights advocacy exemplify the evolution of one-
time heresies into accepted methods of practice. See GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAW-
YERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978); GERALD P.
LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAVYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE
(1992).
389. See Robert P. George, Public Reason and Political Conflict: Abortion and Homosexual-
ity, 106 YALE L.J. 2475, 2504 (1997) ("A sound principle of public reason for a deliberative democ-
racy would indeed require citizens and policymakers to justify their political advocacy and action
by appeal to principles of justice and other moral principles accessible to their fellow citizens by
virtue of their 'common human reason."').
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state violence will never end race-infected community violence. Only com-
munity-provisional and evanescent-momentarily formed inside and out-
side the modem state may resolve that ultimate irony of violence, the vio-
lence within its own borders and the violence shared with us.
